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Institutions are humanly devised constraints that shape interactions between
people. Changing those constraints affects people’s incentives and, therefore, affects
economic, political, and social outcomes. Studying institutional arrangements helps to
shed some light on why there is a high variation of the level of economic
development across countries. These theses address the questions of how institutions
are formed, how institutional changes affect incentives, and how they influence
economic development.
The first chapter studies the effect of change in the rule that assign points in
soccer on optimal strategies of soccer teams playing in a tournament. It demonstrates
that the change in the rule increases incentives of teams to collude in order to trade
points. It also has heterogeneous effects on top and lesser teams.
Second chapter looks at impact of good regional governance infrastructure on
inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 24 transition countries from 1993 to
2003. The model takes into account spatial spillovers and spatially correlated error
terms. It is estimated by a recently developed generalized method of moment (GMM)
three-stage procedure. The results show that the regional quality of institutions is an
important factor that explains variations in FDI inflows. The positive effect of good
regional governance dominates the effect of better developed regional markets.
The third chapter investigates determinants of the quality of governance inside a
country. The main finding is the importance of relative geographical location: good
governance in the neighboring countries has a positive impact on quality of
governance inside a particular country. Spatial links work mostly through long-term
determinants of governance that include culture, legal system, and colonial history. At
the same time, the closest neighbors have the strongest impact on quality of
governance, while cultural and colonial ” neighbors” that are not close
geographically, have smaller impact on the local institutional development.
According to our results, cross-country regressions that do not take into account
spatial interdependence of countries produce biased estimation of the coefficients and
incorrect inference of variance-covariance matrix.
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Chapter 1: Three-point-for-win in soccer rule: are there
incentives for match fixing?
Introduction
In the middle of the 1990s, the European soccer body UEFA recommended to
the National Soccer Federations that they should reward three points for a win instead
of two points as under the old regulations. Soon, this new system was universally
adopted by all countries. The purpose of this change in the rules was to encourage a
more attractive attacking style of play and reduce the number of scoreless games that
were then widespread. However, the results of the new regulation have been mixed.
For example, Guedes and Fernando (2002) showed that, even though the new rule
reduced the number of draws and increased the average number of goals per game,
the effects have not been uniformly distributed across all clubs. While the new system
encouraged top clubs to play more aggressive soccer, lesser clubs have chosen to play
defensively in reaction to the aggressive strategy of the top clubs.
More importantly, as will be shown in this paper, the new rules also created an
incentive for explicit or implicit collusion among lesser clubs. This paper argues that
the change in soccer regulations determining the number of points assigned for a win
can potentially lead to collusion between teams. The teams can pursue the strategy of
winning home games in exchange for losing away games. This strategy is consistent
with the objective to maximize the total number of points in a season for a team that
does not have the goal to win the championship. We look for evidence of collusion in
the Ukrainian first division and compare the behavior of the clubs under the old and
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new rules. Under the new rule, there is a pattern of results that is consistent with
collusion. The Ukrainian and Italian leagues are compared under the three-point
system to look for evidence of cross-sectional differences. The Italian league does not
have a statistically significant relationship between the outcomes of the games
between a pair of teams. As argued in this paper, this difference can be attributed to
the higher probability of being caught and the higher potential monetary loses in the
Italian Seria A.
Until recently, the study of corruption was primarily focused on measuring the
overall level of corruption and its effect on the economic growth and income
distribution in different countries. The most popular index that measures corruption
levels and most frequently used by researchers is the Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which ranks countries in terms of the degree to
which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. The CPI
is a composite index currently derived from 18 different surveys and based on the
opinions of regional experts, government officials, and businessmen.1 It has been
published by Transparency International on an annual basis since 1995. Some
estimates of corruption earlier than 1995 are also available but only for a very limited
group of countries.
The study of the effects of corruption on growth and inequality include
Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995, 2004), and Baretto (2003). Most empirical
studies found negative correlations between the level of corruption and economic
growth (Mauro 1995). Shleifer and Vishny (1993), for example, argued that
1For more details please visit http://www.icgg.org/
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corruption is costly to economic development because it requires secrecy. It distorts
development by channeling funds into sectors where the monitoring of activities is
difficult (e.g., construction or national defense). At the same time, it drains resources
from more transparent sectors, such as education and health. The imperative of
secrecy also gives political leaders an incentive to increase barriers to entry and
reduce economic competition. Mauro (2004) analyzed a data set consisting of
subjective indices of corruption, the amount of red tape, the efficiency of the judicial
system, and various categories of political stability for a cross-section of countries.
He found corruption lowers investment, thereby lowering economic growth. Mocan
(2004) used survey data on bribes collected in different countries and suggested an
index of corruption proportional to the actual number of bribes experienced by
respondents in these countries. Mocan measured not only the number of bribes but
also the perception of the level of corruption in the country and found that the
perception of corruption is very strongly correlated with the quality of institutions in a
given country.
An alternative theory suggests that corruption might be growth enhancing,
especially in countries with highly regulated markets, because it loosens rigid
economic ties and speeds up the processes of decision-making. As a result, it can
reduce transaction costs and improve economic performance. This line of argument
was first suggested by Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968).
While very important, these approaches are not very informative in terms of
explaining the exact mechanisms of corruption and finding policies that will reduce it.
These papers discuss the consequences of corruption without trying to explain why
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some countries remain trapped in a high level of corruption and how others managed
to escape. The key question to answer is: Are there features of culture, institutions, or
political systems in a particular country that explain why this country is more corrupt
than another? The general level of corruption is a vector to all social interactions
within a country. These interactions are governed by social norms and legal
regulations accepted by economic agents. By changing norms and regulations, agents
can, to some extent, influence the level of corruption. To better understand how and
why the quality of governance and the level of corruption influence the economy and
society in general, a study of corruption on the micro level is necessary. This type of
study can show the exact mechanisms and channels that connect markets, firms, and
organizations on the one hand and the government and the bureaucracy on the other.
There are some obstacles that prevent applied microeconomic studies of
corruption and its effects. Corruption is difficult to measure with the same means as
GDP or the rate of growth. So, every time the researcher measures corruption by
some index based on subjective expert opinions or some set of objective proxies the
legitimate objection arises as to the selection of the experts or variables. Moreover,
even if researchers can agree on some universal measure of corruption, the micro-
level data on corruption is difficult to collect because of the illegal nature of these
types of transactions. Unwillingness to reveal full and unbiased information also
generates the problem of the quality of collected data.
To circumvent obstacles such as lack of objective measures and lack of good-
quality data, researchers have proposed innovations that allow for the study
corruption on a disaggregated level. One approach to the causes and effects of
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corruption is based on the study of historical documents. Wallis (2004) showed how
changes in state constitutions in the U.S. during the 1840s helped to increase the
transparency of the government and to reduce corruption. These institutional
innovations were American inventions, and today hard budget constraints and
transparent corporate forms with secure stockholder rights are important institutional
determinants of successful economies.
Duggan and Levitt (2002) suggested studying indirect evidence of corruption
in sports. The evidence of corruption could be uncovered with some degree of
certainty by finding patterns of events that indicate the existence of corruption and
that are inconsistent with the alternative theory of honest behavior. They studied
corruption in the highest echelon of sumo wrestling and showed that under the current
system of sumo tournaments there is a room for illegal match rigging between
wrestlers because of the nonlinearity of the payoffs for winning matches. They also
showed that increased media scrutiny reduces match fixing confirming the idea that
corruption likes secrecy and can be fought by promoting government policy
transparency and an independent press. A similar approach is introduced in this paper
to look for evidence of corruption in soccer. A game theoretical model that separates
patterns consistent with corruption from patterns consistent with honest play is
constructed and the model’s predictions are empirically tested. By looking at soccer,
this paper focuses on two topics: the effect of changes in the rules and regulations on
the way the game is played and on the level of corruption in soccer.
The study of sport competitions seems like a very promising area to test
theories of human behavior in general and of economics specifically. A sport
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competition usually has a well-defined set of rules and regulations, the outcomes are
observable, and statistical data are available. It can be considered as a well-defined
social experiment to test theoretical predictions made by researchers. For example,
Walker and Wooders ( 2001) tested game theoretic predictions on Nash equilibrium
with mixed strategies by looking at tennis servings. They found that, in the contrast
with the mixed-strategy equilibrium, professional tennis players switch serves from
left to right too often. At the same time, serving strategies of better players were
closer to the prediction of the model. Another example is Chiappori, Levitt, and
Groseclose (2002) who studied if mixed strategy game theoretic predictions are in
accord with the strategies of players who take soccer penalty kicks. They found that
the theory performs quite well when tested against the actual data.
The current paper is organized as follows. In section 2, historical and factual
background on the rules and regulations of soccer and explain the structure of a
typical soccer tournament are given. Section 3 develops the model of collusion
between teams. Section 4 tests the predictions of the model and elaborates on the
arguments. Section 5 gives conclusions and plans for future research.
Historical background
The history of soccer begins in 1863 in England when rugby football and
association football split into two different sports. This lead to the founding of the
world’s first football association. Soccer has evolved considerably during the last 140
years and has experienced many changes that have improved the game. The
philosophy of soccer emphasizes the maintenance of balance between offense and
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defense. The fact that teams score approximately 2.6 goals combined per game makes
each goal very valuable and discourages teams from placing all their resources into
offense. At the same time, there has been an overall trend of decline in the average
number of goals per game throughout most of the 20th century. The trend become
apparent in the 1960’s when Italian teams applied catenaccio2 tactics and dominated
international club soccer competitions. Catenaccio is a command tactic that is built on
protecting one’s goal as a priority and attacking the opponent’s goal as a secondary
objective.
The success of catenaccio in Italy and internationally forced teams to play
more defensive soccer and reduced the average number of goals between 1960 and
19803. To promote more aggressive soccer, the European soccer body UEFA
recommended awarding three points for a win instead of two points as under the old
regulations. Soon, the new system was universally adopted by all countries under the
guidance of the international soccer organization FIFA.
While there is some evidence that this change had its intended effect, the
effect has not been as dramatic as expected. Brocas and Carrillo (2004) set up a
dynamic game model to study the implications of the three-point win rule and the
“golden goal” rule on the flow of soccer matches. They showed that in some
2 "Catenaccio describes a tactical system in football with an emphasis on defense and tactical fouls. In Italian
catenaccio means “door-bolt” and it effectively means a highly organized backline defense which is intended to
prevent goals. It was made famous by Argentinean trainer Helenio Herrera of Inter Milan in the 1960s who used it
to grind out 1-0 wins over opponents in their league games." (Wikipedia)
3 There was a similar tendency in the NHL where defensive tactics proved to be more successful in winning the
Stanley Cup during the late 90's. Also, the average number of goals scored per game has reduced dramatically
over the last 15 years.
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circumstances the incentive for teams to play offensively may be lower under the
three-point rule than under the traditional two-point victory rule.
Guedes and Fernando (2002) studied the effects of the new rule on team
strategies in the Portuguese first division league. Even though the average number of
goals per game increased from 2.40 to 2.60, or by 8.5%, the favorites scored 13.4%
more goals and losers scored only 1.3% more. Guedes and Fernando (2002)
concluded that the new rule has a non-uniform impact on top teams versus lesser
teams. It makes top teams play more aggressively and lesser teams more defensively.
Our paper confirms that there are significant differences between the strategies of the
top teams and the rest of the teams.
In addition to the small effect on the number of goals, the potential danger of
the new rule is that it penalizes “quality” draws when teams make a considerable
effort but cannot win because they are evenly matched. In this case, teams receive
only two points combined. On the other hand, if one of the teams wins it gets three
points.
Can teams collude to increase the expected number of points if they meet
more than once? Suppose that two teams of the same quality meet twice per season
and the probability of a draw is very high4 and the situation is repeated for many
years. Rational managers would prefer to agree on a home win for sure and to lose an
away game in exchange, rather than to fight in each game with the high probability of
a draw. Under collusion, each team would end up with three points and higher
4 In a typical soccer tournament teams play twice per season. The unconditional probability of a draw
is in a range 0.22- 0.32 in our sample (Table 1). The probability of a draw under a two point rule or in
Italian Seria A is in a range 0.26-0.36 in a match between teams that finish the season below the third
place
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chances of avoiding relegation to the lower division. This type of collusion would be
difficult to uncover, because it does not require cash transfers or any sort of written
agreement between teams. The deal can be reached in an informal meeting between
owners, managers, or even influential players of two teams. It even should not be in a
form of agreement on a certain outcome. A low level of effort from an away team that
substantially increases chances for a home team to win would be sufficient. As will
be demonstrated in a theoretical model, win-at-home and loss-away is a self-
enforcing strategy in a repeated game with a positive probability of meeting next
season.
Empirically, if collusion is common event for at least some team-pairs, a loss
in the away game will be a statistically significant predictor of a win in the home
game. This problem is especially relevant if teams can strategically interact during
long tournaments and can lead to corruption and point trading between teams. It is
shown that under the current system of point-counting there is a possibility of
corruption and point trading between teams who want to achieve a decent tournament
position and avoid relegation to the lower division but who do not want to win the
tournament. However, the result does not apply to the top teams who have incentives
and abilities to win every game and the tournament as a whole. Also, it is important to
point out that the results are valid only for the specific structure of the competition
when many teams compete over a long period of time and when the interactions
between teams are repeated across many seasons. For example, results will not apply
to a tournament that has playoff games after the regular season and without the
relegation rule.
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It is important to emphasize the differences between the structure of North
American and European sport leagues. First, the European soccer tournament not
only rewards the champions but also severely punishes the losers. The exact
mechanism of punishment consists of relegation to the lower division. A club that is
relegated in principle may never make it back to the first division. Such a club suffers
a loss of revenue from ticket sales, TV broadcasts, and sponsors. It may also lose its
best players, since often players’ contracts often have a relegation clause. This system
leads to rotation, with the worst clubs from the higher divisions being replaced by the
best clubs from the lower divisions.
Second, in contrast to North American sports, the probability of a draw is very
high. In fact, it ranges around 20% to 30%, depending on the country and time span.
For example, in the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, 30% of all games were tied
and 34% of all ties were scoreless. In the early 1980’s, the Soviet soccer federation
introduced a clause to the rules that gave a team no points for a draw if the team
reached a cap of ten draws per season.
Third, since there are no playoff games, competition in the middle of the table
is not very intense. When the group of leaders is determined often the rest of the pack
give up fighting for the championship and only try to maintain their distance from the
relegation zone. This particular feature of a typical soccer competition in Europe
creates a set of clubs - soccer clubs that do not have the ambition or the ability to win
tournaments but merely try to stay in the middle to play in the tournament next season
– we want to concentrate this study.
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Model
This section develops a model of strategic interaction between two teams who
seek to maximize utility over an infinite number of periods. First, we look at the
optimal strategy of each team within a period, and then we extend our analysis over
an infinite horizon.
Set up
The following notation is used:
1. There are two teams i={h, a} playing a game. h stands for the team that plays a
home game and a for the team that plays an away game to distinguish between
home and away games to model a home team advantage. The team which plays
a game at home has a higher chance to win the game.
2. There are infinite number of periods t=1,2,3,... each representing a regular
season. The interactions between the teams continue over time and each team
accumulates a history of previous interactions with the other team.
3. Within a period teams meet twice, and they switch roles between home and
away teams. Matches are indexed by j=1,2
4. A team can pick one of the following strategies
S={fair_play,collusion}
Definition 1 The match is a lottery with },,{ 321









1 is probability of win, p
i
2 is probability of draw, and p
i
3 is probability of
12
loss.
Outcomes of the lottery C={win, draw, lose}.
Definition 2 R is a rule that transforms outcome C into points x.
R: C→ x.
Timing within a period t
The schedule is decided. One of the teams plays the first match at home and the
second match away. It is assumed that the probability to win at home is greater





2. Teams can openly negotiate the strategies they are going to choose before
match 1 starts. If they both choose to collude in a match j, then the outcome is
known with certainty. If both teams play a fair play strategy, then p
i
k>0 for all k.
In other words, each outcome of the game is possible.
3. After teams decide on the strategies, the games are played and the points are
assigned according to the rule R.
4. Game goes to the next period t+1 with probability φ. There is a small positive




Each team has an objective to maximize the expected life-time utility. The





A. Team chooses fair play

























B. Team chooses to cooperate
If both teams cooperate they can choose any outcome C they like. Consider
the following collusion scheme: teams win at home and lose away. Another possible
strategy is to lose at home and win away, but it is not plausible empirically. The
scheme that involves a draw cannot be an equilibrium strategy under the three-point
rule since it is inferior to the strategies mentioned above. The collusion strategy to
win at home and lose away is a focal point that is both a Nash equilibrium under the
condition specified below and that does not set off alarms for sport fans and officials.
Expected utility of colluding in two games:
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EU ct
i = k − µD for i = h, a. ,
where µ is the probability of being caught, and D is the penalty of cheating measured
in terms of lost points5.
Teams will choose to cooperate over fair play if the following conditions hold:
k(p1
h + p1
a ) + (p2
h + p2
a ) < k − µD (3)
k(p1
h + p1
a ) + (k − 1)(p2
h + p2
a ) > k + µD (4)










µD = 0 if k = 2














if k > 2 (6)
µD = 0 if k = 2
Under the two-point win rule even a small chance of being caught deters
teams from trading home wins. When k>2, teams are more likely to collude if the
probability of having a draw is high or the expected penalty of being caught is low. In
addition, the higher the reward k for a win relative to the reward for a draw, the more
likely collusion between teams becomes.
Parameter )(MfLD += is a function of the prestige and profitability of the
tournament. Punishment could vary from a deduction of points, L, for both teams to
relegation to the lower division if a team is found guilty of match-fixing. In the latter
5 Officials can directly subtract certain number of points, L, from a team that was caught cheating.
They can also impose economic sanctions, M. Total disutility for a team that was caught cheating is
)(MfLD +=
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case, M, represents the loss of all sources of profits specific to the higher division,
such as TV money, opportunity to play in international competitions, and higher
ticket prices. Parameter µ depends on the general attitude of sport officials and fans
towards corruption and on how hard soccer authorities fight corruption. An incident
of corruption is more likely to be exposed if the general level of corruption in a
country is low. µ also depends on the ability of the media to find and expose the
incidents of corruption in the country. In countries with a high level of corruption, µ
tends to be close to 0 and examples of uncovering collusion between teams are
extremely rare.
Ruling out deviations
The team that plays the first game at home has an incentive to deviate from
the “win home-loss away” strategy and make an effort to win the second game of the
season. To rule out this incentive consider the following punishment mechanism:
• At t+1 an away team colludes if the home team did not deviate at time t.
• The away team plays a fair game from time t+1 on otherwise.
Before proceeding further, the following parameters should be defined:
)1,0(1 ∈δ a discount factor between periods t and t+1
1ϕδδ = a discount factor adjusted for probability of relegation
Vfp life-time utility of playing fair play
Vc life-time utility of playing collusion
vfp one period utility of playing fair play
16
vc one period utility of playing collusion
vd one period utility of deviation
A one period utility of collusion, deviation and fair-play strategies are:
v c = k − µD
v d = k − µD + kp1
a + p2
a





Corresponding life-time utilities are expressed as:
V c = v c + δV c
V fp = v fp + δV fp
V d = v d + δV fp
Then dc VV > if
δ > v d−v cv d−v fp
or
(7)

















(7) can be simplified and rewritten as:
(8)
Under the old rule k=2. Assuming µD>0, the right hand side of (8) is greater
than 1 and the collusion cannot be sustained in the multi-period game. On the other
hand, under the new rule k=3. If probability of a draw is high and Dp h µ>2 , which is
more likely if penalty D is small or if the probability of being caught µ is low, the
collusion equilibrium strategy can be supported if the discount factor δ in the range
)1,( 0δ .
Empirical part
This section discusses the empirical evidence that support the predictions of
the model.
1. There is an opportunity for match-fixing between teams that increases their
welfare in terms of maximizing the number of points in the tournament. The
probability of collusion is higher if a draw is a likely outcome of a match and
δ > δ 0 = k ( 1 − p 1
h ) − ( k − 1 ) p 2
h
k ( 1 − p 1
h ) − µ D − p 2
h
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teams do not compete for the championship. Therefore, teams of equal
strength that do not compete for the top three spots in the tournament are more
likely to trade points. On the other hand, teams of the highest quality are not
likely to be engaged in point trading.
2. Collusion is more likely to occur in a country with a high level of
corruption and less media exposure. Collusion is less likely to occur in a
prestigious tournament with high monetary rewards.
Data description
Information on competition results is available over the Internet. The most
complete and up-to-date source of various historical and contemporary soccer results
is The Rec.Sport.Soccer Statistics Foundation that currently tracks results from more
than a hundred soccer leagues. The website has a detailed description of the date of
each game, outcome of the match, and number of goals scored and conceded.
The Ukrainian national tournament is played each year from August until June
of the next year. A season is divided into two equal parts. The first part is played
August through December and the second part February through June. The number of
teams varied over the studied period in a range of 14-18 teams. Each team plays twice
per season against all other teams. One match is played at home and one is played
away. For each pair, the team that played the first round game at home was randomly
determined by the officials according to the tournament schedule. A win is rewarded
with 3 points, a draw with 1 point, and a loss with 0 points. At the end of the season,
teams that took one of the first three places continued to play in the international
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competitions (the European Champions League and the UEFA cup) with potentially
high monetary bonuses as a reward. The worst two teams were transferred to the
lower division.
An empirical model developed in the paper takes into account these features
and divides all teams into two groups: top teams competing for the three highest spots
and other teams whose goal is primarily to avoid relegation and play in the
tournament next year. This division is natural because the pool of teams competing
for the first three spots was limited and very stable. In fact, only two teams were
competing for the first two spots during 1995-2003 because of their financial
superiority and ability to buy more talented players, better training facilities, and
better management staff.
We looked at the Ukrainian league tournaments in 1995-2003 and constructed
a database of 1870 games. We also constructed tournament standings in the end of
each season that have the following information: the final ranking of teams based on
the total number of points; the total number of wins, draws, and losses for each team;
and the total number of goals scored and conceded by each team.
To compare our results for the Ukrainian league over time and across
countries, it is important to look at additional data. First, we looked at how the change
in the point assignment changed the outcomes of games and teams’ tactics. Since
Ukraine did not exist as a separate state before 1991, we collected the data on the
USSR soccer competitions in 1980-1991 to compare the results under the two- and
three-point systems. We realize that the data is not perfect but believe that the
comparison is still valid because Ukrainian soccer was on the leading positions in the
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USSR soccer competitions. During the 70’s and 80’s, Ukrainian soccer was always
represented by 5-6 teams, who constituted 30% of the first division. For the cross-
section comparison, we looked at the Italian Serie A results in 1993-2003. The Italian
Serie A was chosen as a reference point, since it is one of the most competitive soccer
leagues in the world. It attracts a lot of attention from the mass media and the players
are paid high salaries and bonuses. Therefore, the possibility of match-fixing is
greatly reduced and opportunities for punishment are higher than in the Ukraine.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the dataset. It shows outcome
frequencies of home losses, draws, and wins for the whole sample and for the two
sub-samples in each country: the sub-sample of games where at least one of the teams
ended a season in the top three spots and the sub-sample of the other games. We will
also refer to the first sub-sample as competitive games. There was a decrease in the
percentage of home game draws from 26% under the two-point rule to 22% under the
three-point rule. Even though the percentage of the home game losses increased from
20% to 24%, the increase came in the competitive games: 24% against 32%. At the
same time, we observe big deviations in the outcome frequencies of the Ukrainian
league as compared with the Italian Serie A. Thirty-two percent of all games in Italy
were draws—which is 50% higher than in the Ukraine. Also, the home team won
only 46% of the games in Italy, while in the Ukraine the home team won 54% of the
games. These differences are consistent with the model of collusion that predicts
more honest games in more competitive leagues.
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Loss in a home game
games 107a 118 225 125 188 313 134 222 356
share, % 32 b 20 24 24 18 20 27 19 21
Draw in a home game
games 63 141 204 139 281 420 124 422 546
share, % 19 23 22 26 26 26 25 36 32
Win in a home game
games 160 346 506 267 603 870 246 536 782
share, % 48 57 54 50 56 54 49 45 46
Means and standard deviations:
1.57c 1.55 1.55 1.69 1.59 1.62 1.57 1.62 1.60
1.50d 1.25 1.34 1.41 1.27 1.32 1.40 1.24 1.29
1.16 0.83 0.95 1.08 0.86 0.93 1.08 1.05 1.06
1.30 0.93 1.09 1.11 0.93 1.00 1.09 1.04 1.06
Sample size 330 605 935 531 1072 1603 504 1180 1684
Source: Authorth's calculations
Notes:
a Total number of occurencies for a subgroup








Three points Two points
The table also presents summary statistics of means and standard deviations of
goals scored and conceded by the home team. Under the three-point rule, all teams
scored 2.5 goals per game, while under the two-point rule they scored 2.55. This
number is higher in Italy: 2.66 goals per game mostly because away teams score more
than one goal per game.
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Econometric model





variables that characterize abilities of the teams. The ability of team i to score in a
particular game against team j can be written as:
ijijijjiij gyyghG εε +=++= ),(
**
where h>0 represents home field advantage
Analogously,
jijijiijji gyygG νν +=+= ),(
**
where ),0(~ 2εσε ij and ),0(~
2
νσν ji
The probability of a win for the team i is:
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then we can apply the following logit model:
P(win) = P(G ij > G ji) = P(ω < λ 0 + λ 1 yi
∗ + λ 2 yj
∗ )
= Logit(λ 0 + λ 1 yi
∗ + λ 2 yj
∗ )
where λ0=h+ α0-β0 and λm= αm- βm, m=1,2























Only the games in the second part of each season were considered. We looked
at the outcome of the match for the home team. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable that takes value of 1 if a home team i won the game (win at home). The
explanatory variable of the interest is loss away. Loss away is a dummy variable that
takes value of 1 if a home team i lost the game against j in the first round. To control
for the strength of the teams, we use the following variables:
• avg home for average number of goals per game scored by the home team in a
season;
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• avg home against average number of goals per game conceded by the home
team in a season;
• avg away for average number of goals per game scored by the away team in a
season; a
• avg away against average number of goals per game conceded by the away
team in a season.
Since the outcome of the current game is directly determined by the goals
scored in the game, independent variables are not completely exogenous. The total
number of goals scored and conceded in a season includes the goals in the current
game. To deal with the endogeneity problem, we adjusted the control variables by
factoring out goals scored and conceded in the current game, subtracting them from
the totals when calculating averages. Moreover, we allowed error terms to be pair
specific. Therefore, we estimated regressions using robust errors corrected for
heteroskedastisity and clustering effects for each pair of teams.
Given the control for the strengths of the teams, a loss in the first game should
have no effect on the probability of the win in the second game under the null
hypothesis of no collusion. In fact, we expect the sign of the coefficient of the loss
away variable to be negative if the control variables do not capture all the relevant
information that helps to predict the outcome of the game. The fact that a team was
beaten in a game against a particular opponent in the first round might indicate that
the style of the team is ineffective to beat the opponent. Therefore, we expect that the
team is less likely to win the current game if it lost a game against the opponent in the
25
past. Under the alternative hypothesis that collusion took place and teams agreed to
trade points, the sign of the coefficient of the loss away should be positive.
In addition, we want to make a distinction between competitive games and the
rest of the games. The model developed in the previous section predicts that honest
play is more likely if at least one of the teams has the ambition to win the tournament.
We do not expect collusion in games where one or both teams finished the
tournament in the top three spots. On the other hand, collusion is likely between
teams of comparable abilities who do not have the goal to win the tournament.
Therefore, in addition to the whole sample we ran separate regressions for two
subsamples of games: a competitive game subsample where at least one of the teams
ended the season in the top three spots and a subsample of other games.
Results
First, we conduct a cross-sectional analysis. Table 2 shows the results of a
logit regression (*) for the Ukrainian and Italian leagues. The outcome of the home
game does not depend on the outcome of the away game in the Italian league. This
result holds for the whole sample, as well as for the two subsamples of competitive
and non-competitive games. The results are different in the Ukrainian competitions.
While the coefficient of loss away is -0.948 for the subsample of competitive games,
it is positive and significant 0.40 for the rest of the sample. Both coefficients are
significant at 5% level and statistically different from each other at 1% level.
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Table 2 Logit regressions. 3 points for win. Italy and Ukraine comparison
Dependent variable is the win in the home game. 1="Yes" 2="No"
Ukraine Italy Ukraine Italy Ukraine Italy
Loss in away game 0.114 0.008 -0.948*** 0.259 0.400** -0.072
1="Yes" 0="No" [0.71] [0.07] [2.84] [1.27] [2.27] [0.54]
Home team
Average goals for per game 1.026*** 0.924*** 0.387 1.046*** 1.278*** 0.806***
[4.52] [5.38] [1.05] [3.03] [3.53] [3.76]
Average goals against per game -0.993*** -0.996*** -2.588*** -1.302*** -0.758*** -0.819***
[4.44] [5.18] [4.32] [3.25] [2.80] [3.47]
Away team
Average goals for per game -1.293*** -0.657*** -0.945*** -0.986*** -0.934** -0.526**
[5.77] [4.17] [2.65] [3.17] [2.53] [2.49]
Average goals against per game 1.158*** 1.543*** 1.284** 1.468*** 0.956*** 1.571***
[4.51] [7.92] [2.13] [4.01] [3.49] [6.46]
Constant 0.317 -1.054** 2.515 -0.423 -0.497 -1.321**
[0.44] [2.14] [1.64] [0.43] [0.55] [2.32]
Observations 935 1610 330 502 605 1108
Robust z statistics in brackets





Home or away team
ended at top 3
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where strength is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if at least one of the teams
in the current game ended the season in the top three and takes 0 otherwise (see Table
3).
We ran the Wald test to check for the equality of coefficient in the competitive
games and the rest of the games that was rejected at 1% level for the Ukrainian
sample and could not be rejected for the Italian one. The results show that there is a
clear distinction between competitive games and other games in the Ukrainian
national tournament. In addition, this points to the possibility of collusion between
lesser teams in the Ukraine. The difference between Italian and Ukrainian
competitions according to the model developed in the previous section can be
attributed to the prohibitively high risk of collusion and lower overall level of
corruption in Italy.
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Table 3 Logit regressions. Italy and Ukraine comparison
Dependent variable is the win in the home game. 1="Yes" 0="No"
Ukraine Italy
Loss in away game*strength -0.885*** 0.106
[3.44] [0.63]
Loss in away game*(1-strength) 0.405** -0.026
[2.40] [0.21]
Home team
Average goals for per game 1.138*** 0.910***
[4.84] [5.30]
Average goals against per game -1.170*** -0.985***
[5.07] [5.10]
Away team
Average goals for per game -0.940*** -0.684***
[3.81] [4.23]





Robust z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All control variables are significant and have expected signs. A team that on
average scores more goals is more likely to win. Therefore, the probability of winning
in a home game increases if the home team on average scores more goals and
decreases if an away team scores more goals. A team that on average concedes more
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goals is less likely to win. The probability of winning a home game decreases if a
home team concedes more goals and increases if an away team concedes more goals.
According to the results of the cross-country regressions, we make the
following conclusions. First, the outcome of a game between two teams in the
Ukraine depends on how the teams played in the past. The relationship is
quantitatively and qualitatively different for the competitive sub-sample and the rest
of the games. It is positive and significant at 0.40 for the latter and negative and
significant at -0.948 for the former. Second, there is no statistically significant
connection between the current and previous games in our benchmark example. In the
Italian league, the result of the current game cannot be explained by the way teams
played in the past.
Next, we compare the results under the two- and three-point rules. As the
model developed in previous section demonstrated, clubs have no incentive to trade
home wins under the two-point system if the possibility of being caught is positive.
According to Table 4, the result of the current game between two teams does not
depend on the result of the previous game between the same teams under the two-
point rule. The coefficient of loss away is positive but not significantly different from
zero for the whole sample and for both subsamples. For the competitive games the
coefficient is 0.044 and for the rest of the games it is 0.195; which is two times
smaller than under the three-point system. We also run a Wald test for a difference of
coefficients under two and three point rules and reject it for three point rule (Table 5).
These findings confirm our intuition that the new rule created more incentives for
point trading and therefore produced a statistically significant relationship between
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the outcomes of the home and away games for teams in the lower part of the
tournament table.
We also run regressions on the average number of points gained by a team in
the current season as an additional control variable. Here, we found a high degree of
collinearity with the other control variables. Moreover, this did not affect the results
of the paper, so we have not included those results in the paper.
Table 4 Logit regressions. 3 points for win and 2 points for win comparison
Dependent variable is the win in the home game. 1="Yes" 0="No"
3 points 2 points 3 points 2 points 3 points 2 points
Loss in away game 0.114 0.148 -0.948*** 0.044 0.400** 0.195
1="Yes" 0="No" [0.71] [1.37] [2.84] [0.22] [2.27] [1.48]
Home team
Average goals for per game 1.026*** 0.558*** 0.387 0.528 1.278*** 0.213
[4.52] [2.65] [1.05] [1.48] [3.53] [0.62]
Average goals against per game -0.993*** -0.499** -2.588*** -1.056** -0.758*** -0.242
[4.44] [2.19] [4.32] [2.07] [2.80] [0.91]
Away team
Average goals for per game -1.293*** -0.928*** -0.945*** -1.095*** -0.934** -0.505
[5.77] [4.84] [2.65] [3.07] [2.53] [1.56]
Average goals against per game 1.158*** 1.380*** 1.284** 1.375*** 0.956*** 1.317***
[4.51] [5.80] [2.13] [2.93] [3.49] [4.76]
Constant 0.317 -0.463 2.515 0.446 -0.497 -0.827
[0.44] [0.90] [1.64] [0.41] [0.55] [1.37]
Observations 935 1518 330 498 605 1020
Robust z statistics in brackets





Home or away team
ended at top 3
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Table 5 Logit regressions. 3 points for win and 2 points for win comparison
Dependent variable is the win in the home game. 1="Yes" 0="No"
3 points 2 points
Loss in away game*strength -0.885*** 0.004
[3.44] [0.02]
Loss in away game*(1-strength) 0.405** 0.206
[2.40] [1.61]
Home team
Average goals for per game 1.138*** 0.593***
[4.84] [2.75]
Average goals against per game -1.170*** -0.530**
[5.07] [2.32]
Away team
Average goals for per game -0.940*** -0.834***
[3.81] [4.05]





Robust z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Conclusions
The new system of points assigned for the outcomes of soccer games has
produced mixed results. It was beneficial for competitive tournaments such as the
Italian Serie A, as it promoted a more attacking style of play and increased the
number of goals. However, in less competitive environments it had a negligible effect
on the scoring and produced more corruption and manipulation of the outcomes of
games. The evidence presented in this paper shows that there is a statistically
significant connection between the outcome of the home game and the outcome of the
away game between the pair of teams during the season that was not statistically
significant under the old system of point counting. The results also indicate a striking
difference in the incentives produced by the new system for top teams versus lesser
teams. While top teams are now playing attacking soccer and put an extra effort to
win in a game if they lost the previous one, lesser teams have an incentive to trade
points and employ an even more defensive style than under the old system.
The results, however, do not point conclusively to evidence of corruption
because the statistically significant correlation between results of the first and second
games is also consistent with an equilibrium strategy of exerting more efforts in a
home game and less effort in an away game. Further investigation is required to find
evidence in favor of one of the hypothesis or the other.
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Chapter 2: Regional Governance Infrastructure: The Positive
Externality on the Inflow of Foreign Direct Investment
Introduction
In the 18th century, Adam Smith raised an important question about the causes
of the wealth of the nations. Economic theory has made a considerable progress over
the last 200 years but economists repeatedly come back to this question in hopes to
find a satisfactory answer. One of the predictions of a simple neoclassical model is
the convergence of per capita incomes across countries and geographical regions.
According to this theory, capital should flow from rich to poor countries until the
rates of return to investment are equalized across all countries. Lucas (1990), who
raised the question why capital does not flow from the rich to the poor countries,
made the following observation: a simple neoclassical model with the constant return-
to-scale technology and perfect capital markets estimates that the marginal product of
capital in India is 58 times higher than the marginal product of capital in the US.
Therefore, all new investments should go to India rather than US. As a result, low-
income countries should grow faster; wage rates and amount of capital per worker
should equalize; and income inequality across countries should decrease over time.
In reality, however, income inequality across countries has been increasing for
the last thirty years and, by some estimates, reached the highest level since the 18th
century. In the time of Adam Smith, the differences in GDP per capita between rich
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and poor countries were barely 2-3 fold. Currently, OECD countries have a GDP per
capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) that is 35 times higher than that of
Sub-Saharan Africa region.6 Table 6 shows the recent trends in PPP based GDP per
capita. Despite the fact that the average GDP per capita for all countries grew over the
last 30 years, the average GDP per capita for the poorest 5% of the countries declined
from $800 to $783. The ratio of the GDP per capita of the richest 5% countries to the
GDP per capita of the poorest 5% countries has increased from 25 to 37.














Ratio of GDP per
capita of the richest
5% to the poorest 5%
1975-1979 7257 7326 800 19982 25
1980-1989 7491 7334 814 21979 27
1990-1999 8050 8296 781 24443 31
2000-2004 9009 9875 783 28781 37
Note: GDP per capita, PPP based, in constant US dollars of 2000. Sample consists from all available observations.
Data source: World Bank, GDF and WDI central, August 2005
High volumes of capital flows to the poor countries are simply not observed in
the data. In fact, over the last 30 years, almost 80% of cumulative FDI inflows went
to the high-income countries and only 1.6% of FDI inflows went to the low-income
countries, as shown in Figure 1. The expected negative relationship between the
income level and capital flows is observed only for the middle-income countries: 12%
of total FDI went to the lower middle-income countries and 8% of FDI went to the
upper middle-income countries.





Low income Upper middle income
Lower middle income High income
Figure 1 Distribution of cumulative FDI inflow in 1975-2003 by income groups
Data source: World Bank, GDF and WDI central, August 2005
It is also interesting to look at the geographical locations of the major
recipients of FDI and compare them with geographical location of countries with
different income levels. The majority of countries that received considerable FDI
inflow in 2003 were located in North America, European Union, and South East Asia
as shown in Figure 2. These regions also tended to have higher than average levels of
GDP per capita according to Figure 3. The poorest countries, primarily located in
Africa and Central Asia, received just a small fraction of FDI. These observations
suggest that countries cluster geographically by income levels and by the amount of
FDI they receive thus requiring an explanation on the underling economic forces that
lead to such an even distribution of wealth and capital flows.
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Figure 2 FDI inflow in 2003
Note: FDI inflow in million current US dollars. Data source is World Bank, GDF and WDI central, August 2005
Figure 3 GDP per capita in 2003
Note: GDP per capita, PPP based, in thousand of constant US dollars of 2000. Data source is World Bank, GDF














In his article, Lucas (1990) suggested three possible explanations to reconcile
the empirical regularities with economic theory: differences in human capital,
differences in technologies, and capital market imperfections. He argued that the
differences in the marginal product of capital vanish if the differences in human
capital and technologies across countries are taken into account. In addition, he
indicated that capital market imperfections and political risks can prevent capital from
flowing to countries with higher return on investment. These explanations, however,
do not answer the fundamental question: why some countries are successful in
accumulating human capital, generating new technologies, and lowering investment
risks while others trapped in poverty.
Currently, there are two competing - but not mutually exclusive theories - that
address this question. These theories can be broadly defined as a new economic
geography and institutional theory of development. The first theory emphasizes that a
good geographical location, abundance of natural resources, arable land, and water
are key components for economic development. As the centers of economic activities
are formed in places that have favorable geographical locations and natural resources,
they start growing by attracting additional labor and capital from less favorable
places. Assuming the increasing return-to-scale technology, the growing economic
centers start benefiting from an agglomeration as well as bigger local markets and
become even more attractive places for migration and capital investment. Therefore, a
self-reinforcing agglomeration process can produce the clustered picture of the world
that is observed today.7
7 See, for example, Baldwin at al (2001)
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The economic geography theory, however, cannot explain historical processes
that led to destruction of old economic powers and subsequent creation of the new
centers of development. An institutional theory of development, on the other hand,
underlines organization of societies and creation of the right incentives as major
factors for economic development. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (AJR 2002),
for example, argued that among countries colonized by Europeans, countries that
were rich in 1500 are relatively poor now while countries that were poor 500 years
ago are relatively rich. This reversal of fortunes cannot be explained by geographical
factors since they have remained unchanged. The institutional theory, on the other
hand, explains the economic reversal by institutional changes because Europeans
deeply influenced institutions and political systems of colonized societies. Moreover,
AJR (2001, 2002) argued that Europeans were more likely to create good institutions
that favored growth and protected property rights in the regions that were less
urbanized at the time of colonization. As a result, the reversal of institutions caused
the reversal of income levels that occurred in the late 18th century. There is a growing
empirical literature that supports the idea that institutions are important determinants
of economic development.8 In particular, many researchers tried to resolve “Lucas
Paradox” since FDI and other capital flows are one of the important driving forces
that generate economic growth and produce technological spillovers in developing
countries.9 As an example of recent empirical papers, Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and
8 See, for example, Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), Barro (1999), Hall and Jones (1999)
9 The positive effects of FDIs mentioned in the literature include the following: promotion of economic
growth and economic competition (Campos and Kinoshita 2002, Beck and Laeven 2005), transfer of
knowledge and technologies (Javorcik 2004b), positive spillover effects on domestic firms (Globerman
and Shapiro 2003)
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Volosovych (2005) identified the low quality of institutions as the leading factor that
explained why capital does not flow to poor countries.
It is important to integrate a spatial dimension into the study of the effects of
institutions on the economic development. The fact that consistently different
geographical patterns of FDI inflow are observed across regions suggests the
existence of broader regional factors that determine the choice of FDI location. This
paper studies country and region-specific factors that encourage multinational
companies to invest in a developing country. To answer this question, in addition to
the usual suspects such as a country-specific quality of institutions, GDP, and factor
endowments; broader set of regional characteristics such as a regional GDP and
regional quality of institutions is considered. As argued in this paper, variations in
regional quality of institutions explain a significant part of variations in FDI inflows.
Good economic and political institutions have a positive external effect on the
economic development in the region. This can produce a positive spillover of better
governance from one country to another as a result of better investment climate and
broader market access at the firm’s level. Thus, better regional institutions improve
the regional investment climate and increase FDI inflow into each country of the
region.
To investigate the impact of regional factors, this paper looks at the
experience of 24 transition countries located in Eastern Europe and Central Asia
(ECA) region. Transition provides a researcher with a unique policy experiment to
study how rapid exogenous changes in the organization of societies influence
economic development. The pace and direction of changes were largely determined
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by the previous experience in these countries under Communist rule. Beck and
Laeven (2005), for example, showed that dependence on natural resources and
historical experience of these countries under socialism were major determinants of
institution building in transition by the way these factors influenced the political
structure during the initial years of reforms.
The ECA region became an important destination of FDI inflows. FDI in this
region has increased from US$7.8 billion in 1993 to US$35.6 billion in 2003. At the
same time, FDI flows within the ECA region are distributed very unevenly matching
the worldwide pattern: more developed, relatively rich and well-governed countries
located in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) receiving a major share of FDI while
relatively poor and less-reformed countries located in Central Asia receiving only a
small fraction of FDI. As an illustration of the importance of the regional factors, two
countries from Central Europe and Central Asia regions can be compared. Albania
from the Central Europe and Kyrgyz Republic from the Central Asia are about the
same size in terms of population. They both mostly consist of mountainous terrain
and are not rich with natural resources. Main sectors in both countries are agriculture
and tourism (Adriatic Sea in Albania and Issyk Kul Lake in Kyrgyz Republic). In
1993, Albania had $388 GDP per capita, $18 FDI per person, and 1.8 index of
governance infrastructure. During the same period, Kyrgyz Republic had $452 GDP
per capita, $2.2 FDI per person, and 1.7 index of governance. By 2003, indices of
governance in Albania and Kyrgyzstan had reached 2.7 and 2.8 consequently, which
indicates marginally better progress of reforms in Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, FDI
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per capita in Albania and Kyrgyzstan, in 2003, had reached $56 and $9
consequently10.
In addition to the importance of studying location choice of FDI, our analysis
implements the spatial econometric modeling technique that is developed to estimate
the models with distinct regional patterns of economic variables. In the case of spatial
spillovers and spatial correlations, a simple OLS or panel data estimation will produce
incorrectly identified confidence intervals. Obviously, this will lead to incorrect
conclusions about the level of significance of the regression coefficients. The spatial
econometric technique (Cliff and Ord 1981, Anselin 1988, Kelejian and Prucha 1999,
2004) augments the model by accounting for spatial spillovers. A panel data analysis
with spatial lags of independent variables and spatially correlated error components is
applied in this paper. To our best knowledge, this is the first attempt to estimate the
impact of institutions on countries in transition in the context of a spatial panel data
regression.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. First, theoretical links
between regional governance and local economic development are considered. Second,
importance of FDI for transition economies is analyzed. Third, an econometric model
that includes regional spatial spillover and takes into account spatial correlations is
developed. Fourth, results and main findings are presented. Finally, the robustness
check is presented and possible extensions of the model are discussed.
10 Another pair of countries that made similar progress in terms of reforming governance but
differences in economic development are Romania and Armenia. At the same time, in 2003, Romania
received $85 FDI per capita while Armenia received only $40 FDI per capita.
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Impact of better governance on economic performance in transition
Similar to the worldwide patterns, transition countries are geographically
clustered with respect to their economic development (see De Melo et al, 1997;
Berglof, 2003). Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) enjoyed a relatively
smooth transition, with steady economic growth from 1993 to 2003, while
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries struggled with a steep
economic decline that did not stop until 1999. Eastern European countries also had
better economic performance for a wide range of economic indicators. For example,
Eastern European countries were able to attract $1,250 of FDI per capita per year
during the period, while former Soviet Union countries managed to receive only
$38011. Table 7 presents cumulative FDI into transition countries for the period 1993-
2003.
11 A big part of FDI in CIS countries went to the oil and gas sectors. If we compare FDI in
manufacturing industries, the differences in FDI per capita are even greater.
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Table 7 Cumulative FDI in transition countries in 1993-2003
Country Cumulative FDI in 1993-2003,
million of US$


















Russian Federation 33,900 13.8







Note: FDI inflow in million current US$. Data source: World Bank, GDF and WDI central, August 2005
The variance in economic performance cannot be explained solely by the
differences in macroeconomic policies carried out by the countries because most
former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries took similar macroeconomic
approaches in their transitions to market economies (De Melo et al., 1997; Falcetti,
Raiser and Sanfey, 2002). The recipe prescribed by leading economists and economic
organizations of that period included rapid privatization, price liberalization, and
further macroeconomic stabilization. Mass privatization or voucher programs were
implemented in most CEE and CIS countries (Brada, 1996). The price liberalization
and monetary stabilization programs developed and monitored by the International
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Monetary Fund (IMF) were considered key elements of transition. Gelb et al. (1999)
discussed macroeconomic policies and found “strong common patterns for countries
at similar stages of reforms.”
The diversity can be explained, at least partially, by differences in institutional
structure and the pace of building new economic institutions across countries. As
pointed out by Murrell (2003), "reforming countries ended the 1980s with a set of
formal institutions far different from those of market capitalism." The destruction of
old institutions produced a vacuum of institutional infrastructures that led to a drop in
output and productivity in the short run. Recent empirical studies (Beck and Laeven,
2005; Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Campos and Kinoshita, 2003; Havrylyshyn and van
Rooden, 2003; Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004a) confirmed that the quality of
institutions, government policies, and legal environment played an important role in
the economic development and largely explained the differences in economic
performance of countries in transition. These policies and institutions are referred to
as “local governance infrastructure” throughout the following discussion.
Governance infrastructure is defined as a combination of institutions and
economic policies that regulate relationship between economic agents12. Governance
infrastructure is evaluated as "good" or "bad" with respect to the effects it has for
economic development. Good governance infrastructure includes the following
functions:
12 Globerman and Shapiro (2003) suggested this term as a combination of institutions and government
polices. Similar to social and human capital, governance infrastructure increases the productivity of
capital and reduces the transaction costs of doing business.
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• Create and enforce transparent laws and protect property rights.
• Promote market competition and economic stability
• Solve market externality problems
As an illustration of the positive effect of transparent privatization procedure
on inward FDI, it is important to mention the privatization of Krivorozhstal, the major
Ukrainian state-owned mining and metallurgical works. It was sold to the son–in-law
of the former president Kuchma for $800 million in an “open” tender with only one
local bidder, in June 2004. At least five overseas bidders that included companies
from Russia, EU, United States, and India were not admitted to the auction. The
exclusion was made possible due to the technical change in regulations just a couple
of weeks before the auction. The transaction was revoked as rigged after the
November 2004 presidential elections and Krivorozhstal was sold again in October
2005 to a foreign investor for 4.8 $US billion in an open tender that was televised
nationally.
Promotion of competition and contract law enforcement are other functions of
well-developed market institutions. Better corporate governance and contract laws
reduce transaction costs for firms and organization, hence, increase productivity
(Williamson, 1979). Lack of competition due to high barriers to trade in product and
service sectors reduce social welfare and depress economic growth (Rutherford, Tarr,
and Shepotylo, 2005). Market institutions are important for the successful enterprise
restructuring and at least partially explain differences in enterprise restructuring
across regions (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). Development of market institutions
attracts more capital from abroad and produces a positive spillover effect on
46
performance of domestic firms (Globerman and Shapiro, 2003). Better governance
and economic reforms contribute to the restored economic growth in transition
countries (Havrylyshyn and van Rooden, 2003). Weak intellectual property rights
protection deters foreign investors in technology-intensive sectors that rely heavily on
intellectual property rights. Moreover, a weak intellectual property regime encourages
investors to undertake projects focusing on distribution rather than on local
production (Javorcik, 2004).
Regional patterns of FDI location: market potential, supplier access, and
regional governance
The new economic geography emphasizes the importance of market potential
for the choice of FDI location. The analytical framework for the new economic
geography models was developed in the recent works by Krugman and Venables
(1995), Venables (1996), Markusen and Venables (1999). Assuming an increasing
return-to-scale technology, a multinational enterprise (MNE) reduces costs by
concentrating production in one location. The choice of location is subject to
minimization of transportation and input costs. To minimize transportation costs, the
MNE chooses an area with the largest market potential to locate production facilities
and serves smaller markets through inter-regional and international trade. The choice of
location that minimizes input costs is ambiguous because there are two effects working
in opposite directions. On the one hand, labor costs are positively correlated with the
size of the economy, which reduces probability of investment in a large market. On the
other hand, larger markets reduce input costs by offering wider choice of suppliers
(supplier access) and more competitive market structure, therefore increasing
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probability of investment in a large market. Overall, the theory predicts a positive link
between the market size and the choice of FDI location.
Recent empirical works (Head and Mayer, 2004; Amiti and Javorcik, 2005)
support the prediction of the new economic geography and demonstrate that market
potential and supplier access play an important role in the decision to enter a foreign
market. The first study looks at the market potential motive. It shows that Japanese
firms are more likely to invest in a European region with higher market access
measured as aggregated demand of all EU regions weighted by the distance from the
region itself. The second study looks at both market potential and supplier access
motives. It empirically demonstrates that these motives are the most important
determinants affecting foreign entry of multinational companies into Chinese
provinces.
Figure 4 Worldwide distribution of Volkswagen production facilities
Source: The Volkswagen Group
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There are also anecdotal evidences that support the idea that firms tend to
concentrate production activities close to the large markets. The Volkswagen Group,
the biggest European car maker, operates 47 out of 54 production plants in eleven
European countries, including six Eastern European countries (Figure 4), and sells its
vehicles in more than 150 countries. Volkswagen started its Eastern European
expansion by acquiring Skoda, the largest automaker in the Czech Republic. Over the
last decade, Volkswagen built production facilities in other Eastern European countries,
as well. Currently, it also plans to extend its Eastern European presence eastward by
building a new plant in Russia. Another recent example that illustrates the importance
of market access for the auto industry is Hyundai Motor Co., South Korea's largest
automaker. On January 18th 2006, Reuters News Service reported that “the Czech
government is likely to sign a memorandum with South Korea's Hyundai Motors in
February on the carmaker's investment in a new automotive plant…Hyundai has said
the Czech Republic was the ideal candidate to host its planned 1 billion euro ($1.21
billion) factory to get the company closer to customers in Europe.”
To capitalize on benefits of a large regional market, however, it is very
important that existing political and economic institutions in the region facilitate
economic activities, promote free trade across countries, and encourage competition
between local and foreign producers. As shown in the literature, bad governance inside
the country is the major factor influencing FDI inflows and preventing foreigners from
entering the market (Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych, 2005). In addition, bad
governance in the neighboring countries substantially reduces market access. An
extreme illustration of this influence are the policies of “Iron Curtain” in Eastern
Europe and the “Bamboo Curtain” in South East Asia. These policies prevented
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countries from those regions from wider economic cooperation with their neighbors in
the second part of the 20th century.13
Softer version of protectionist policies and institutions that prevent competition,
increase barriers to entry, and create an unfair advantage for local producers would also
considerably reduce any benefits of the market access mentioned in the literature.
Better regional governance, on the other hand, improves market and supplier access and
leads to an increase in the extent and efficiency of interactions between firms within the
region. Therefore, a positive link between the quality of governance in the region and
FDI inflows in a particular country is expected.
Governance diffusion and FDI: spatial dynamics
Good regional governance infrastructure can also have a direct positive effect
on local governance of each country in the region. Similar to diffusion of knowledge
and technologies, good governance practices and successful reforms implemented in
leading transition countries have a powerful appeal to nearby countries. For rulers of
a badly governed country, it is hard to ignore progress made by successfully
developing countries, especially if they are located in the same region and share a
similar historical and cultural background.
Depending on the political structure, the instrument of influence of population
on inefficient or corrupt rulers range from a voting mechanism to immigration to the
threat of the civil unrest. In a democracy, people would not re-elect an inefficient
government that is unable to provide a decent level of rule and order that has been
13 The Iron Curtain is a term referring to the boundary which economically and politically divided
Europe into two separate areas from the end of World War II until the end of the Cold War, roughly
1945 to 1990. The Bamboo Curtain, the South East Asian version of the Iron Curtain, separated
communist countries of South East Asia from their neighbors.
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achieved in similar countries. In an authoritarian state, there is a possibility of civil
unrest and immigration that force the ruler to maintain some level of governance
comparable with the levels of governance in neighboring countries.14 Therefore,
progress of institutional reforms in a region can force a local government to improve.
That - in turn - increases efficiency of the local economy as well as increases FDI
inflow in the country.
Political transition of Eastern European and Central Asia countries is a good
example of the spatial dynamic process. The initial shock, which started with the fall
of the Berlin Wall, spread in time and space to the neighboring countries and had a
big impact on the governance structure for all countries of the region. Another
example directly related to the political development of transition countries was the
outcome of the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine in.15 which were greatly
determined by the role played by its neighbors ( the European Union and Poland, in
particular).
Spatial Econometrics
The development of empirical spatial models would be impossible without
recent progress in spatial econometrics. Cliff and Ord (1981) suggested the basic
spatial model back in the 1970s, but the model did not receive important theoretical
extensions until the middle of the 1990s, when mainstream economics started to
systematically analyze the spatial dimension. Anselin (2003) and Florax and Vlist
14 For example, Fleck and Hanssen (2005) mentioned that opportunity of residents to relocate to other
countries nearby would constrain the ruler in an attempt to implement bad policies. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001) consider a threat of the civil unrest as an instrument that forces rulers to maintain a
certain level of governance.
15 For a detailed discussion of elections, see for example
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_Ukrainian_presidential_election
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(2003) summarized the classifications and empirical implementation of models that
incorporated spatial externalities and error structures. Estimation of spatial models
requires the inversion of matrices of high dimension and can be unfeasible
computationally when a data set has many observations. Kelejian and Prucha (1999,
2004) suggested a generalized method of moment estimation of spatial models for
estimation of spatial autoregressive parameters and disturbances that is
computationally feasible even for big data sets. Kapoor, Kelejian, and Prucha (2004)
and Elhorst (2003) suggested econometric strategies to estimate panel data models




Transition Report published by European Bank of Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) provides a broad and comprehensive description of the progress
of reforms in 27 transition countries, starting from 1993. EBDR indices of reforms
annually track progress in the following categories: privatization, prices and trade
liberalization; infrastructure reform, competitiveness, and restructuring of enterprises;
and financial sector reform and legal reform. All indices are measured on a scale of 1 to
4.3. Higher numbers represent greater progress.
GDF and WDI central
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The GDF and WDI central database is the primary World Bank database for
development data from officially-recognized international sources. It contains an
expanded set of the economic, social, environmental, and other time series indicators
published in World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance. The
database is updated quarterly. WDI defines FDI inflows as “inflows of investment to
acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of
equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term
capital as shown in the balance of payments”16
Definitions of variables and data sources are presented in Table 8. Summary
statistics for the variables that are used in our empirical analysis are shown in Table 9.
Average net FDI inflow in transition countries is 930 million $US per year. The most
progress of reforms was achieved in small-scale privatization: 3.5. Infrastructure reform
and competition policy are the most problematic scoring 1.9 and 2.1 consequently. A
correlation matrix of EBRD indices and derived index of governance infrastructure,
presented in Table 10, shows a strong correlation between various aspects of market-
oriented reforms suggesting high degree of complementarity of reforms in various
dimensions.
16 In rare cases when FDI inflows are not available in the WDI dataset we use Transition Report 2004
to update the data.
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Table 8 Variable definitions and sources
Variable Definition Source
EBRD indices:
bank_ref Banking reform and interest rate liberalization EBRD Transition Report
competition Competition policy EBRD Transition Report
enterp_reform Governance and enterprise restructuring EBRD Transition Report
trade_lib Trade and foreign exchange system EBRD Transition Report
infrstruct Infrastructure reform EBRD Transition Report
ls_priv Large-scale privatization EBRD Transition Report
fin_reform Securities markets and non-bank financial institutions EBRD Transition Report
price_lib Price liberalization EBRD Transition Report
ss_priv Small-scale privatization EBRD Transition Report
Macroeconomic indicators:
FDI Foreign direct investment, inflows, balance of payment, current $US World development indicators
GDP Gross domestic product, balance of payment, current $US World development indicators
Ex Exports of goods, services and income, balance of payment, current $US World development indicators*
Im Imports of goods, services and income, balance of payment, current $US World development indicators*
pop Population EBRD Transition Report
tariff Collected import tariff rate, % of value of total import EBRD Transition Report
hhexp Household expenditures, current $US World development indicators
Derived variables:
index Simple average of all EBRD indecies Author's calculations
windex Index of regional governance infrastructure Author's calculations
lnfdi ln(FDI)** Author's calculations
lnfdipc ln(FDI/pop) Author's calculations
lngdp ln(GDP) Author's calculations
lngdppc ln(GDP/pop) Author's calculations
trade share (Ex+Im)/GDP Author's calculations
lnpop ln(pop) Author's calculations
lninitgdp ln(GDP(1991)) Author's calculations
lninitgdppc ln(GDP(1993)/pop(1993)) Author's calculations
lnhhexp ln(hhexp) Author's calculations
avg_tariff Collected import tariff rates as % of total value of import, period averageAuthor's calculations
oil_gas Substantial oil and gas resources Author's calculations
EU Countries that joined or scheduled to join EU Author's calculations
Notes:
* There are 4 missing value in WDI dataset: Azerbaijan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan 1993 and Uzbekistan 1994. We used EBRD transition
report to update the data..
** We have one negative value of FDI inflows in Uzbekistan in 1995.
We used an average of net FDI in 1994 and 1995
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Population, million people 264 16.50 29.60 1.35 149.00
Net inward FDI, billion current $US 264 0.93 1.54 -0.02 9.34
GDP, billion current $US 264 36.00 74.90 0.92 435.00
Export, billion current $US 264 13.60 23.50 0.21 163.00
Import, billion current $US 264 12.80 18.70 0.45 103.00
Banking reform and interest rate
liberalization 264 2.4 0.8 1.0 4.0
Competition policy 264 2.1 0.6 1.0 3.0
Governance and enterprise
restructuring 264 2.2 0.7 1.0 3.3
Trade and foreign exchange system 264 3.4 1.1 1.0 4.3
Infrastructure reform 264 1.9 0.7 1.0 3.7
Large-scale privatization 264 2.7 0.9 1.0 4.0
Securities markets and non-bank
financial institutions 264 2.0 0.7 1.0 3.7
Price liberalization 264 3.7 0.7 1.0 4.3
Small-scale privatization 264 3.5 0.9 1.0 4.3
Index of local governance
infrastructure 264 2.6 0.7 1.0 3.8
Index of regional governance
infrastructure 264 2.7 0.4 1.6 3.3
Household expenditures, billion of
current $US 262 29.8 30.8 0.5 222.0
Average collected tariff, % of import 264 4.0 3.7 0.1 14.2
55
























































































































































































enterprise restructuring 0.90 0.72 1.00
Trade and foreign
exchange system 0.81 0.51 0.76 1.00
Infrastructure reform
0.84 0.67 0.77 0.67 1.00
Large-scale privatization
0.77 0.67 0.80 0.73 0.75 1.00
Securities markets and
non-bank financial
institutions 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.57 0.77 0.68 1.00
Price liberalization
0.65 0.44 0.61 0.73 0.61 0.69 0.48 1.00
Small-scale privatization
0.79 0.62 0.79 0.83 0.69 0.81 0.65 0.70 1.00
Index of local
governance
infrastructure 0.93 0.76 0.92 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.82 0.77 0.90 1.00
Index of regional
governance
infrastructure 0.58 0.53 0.55 0.53 0.63 0.54 0.61 0.62 0.58 0.66 1.00
It is worth looking at the regional patterns of economic variables and
governance indicators because of systematic differences they have across the regions.
Regions presented in Figure 5 are Central and Eastern European region (Albania,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia); European former Soviet Union region (Byelorussia, Estonia, Latvia,
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Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine); and Central Asia and Caucus former
Soviet Union region (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).17 This classification naturally follows
from geographical and historical background. Another consideration that led us to the
suggested division is a roughly equal number of countries in each region. Figures 6
and 7 illustrate that FDI and various aspects of governance infrastructure are
substantially different from region to region. The Eastern Europe region consistently
had the highest values of governance infrastructure in every category, while the
Central Asia and Caucus region had the smallest values. Eastern Europe, on average,
received twice as many FDI per year as did European former Soviet Union countries
and four times as many as did the Central Asia and Caucus region. A simple diagram
that shows the relationship between the log of FDI per capita in a country and the
index of regional governance shows strong correlation between two variables (Figure
8).
17 We did not include Serbia , Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republic of Macedonia in the analysis, so
the data set is limited to 24 countries.
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EEC: Eastern European countries
FSU West: Western part of former Soviet Union
FSU East: Eastern part of former Soviet Union





































































































































































EEC: Eastern European countries
FSU West: Western part of former Soviet Union
FSU East: Eastern part of former Soviet Union
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95% CI Fitted values
lnfdi
Solid line presents fitted values of simple OLS regression
 
Figure 8 Correlation of FDI and index of governance
61
Model specification
The functional form of the estimated equation naturally follows from the
gravity model of FDI flows. The gravity equation proved to be a successful analytical
tool that explained bilateral trade flows. Recent theoretical models (Markusen et al,
1996) suggest that location and size of bilateral FDI flows depend on country
characteristics such as a country size, population, factor endowments. Empirical
papers (Brenton et al, 1999; Campos and Kinoshita, 2003; Egger and Pfaffermayr,
2004) showed that the gravity equation is useful in modeling bilateral FDI flows
between countries. The panel consists from 24 transition countries, in 1993-2003. The
model specification and estimation strategy is similar to Kapoor, Kelejian, and Prucha
(2004).









jtijitit uzindexwindexFDI +++= ∑∑
==
γδβ (1)
where i,j=1,2,…,N and t=1,2,…,T
(1) lnFDIit is the logarithm of FDI inflow into country i in year t.
(2) indexit is an index of local governance infrastructure in a country i in a period
t.
(3) wij is a weight which, along with the parameter δ describes how the indexjt in
country j influences the log of FDI in country i at time t. These weights are specified
in more details below. Note that weights have the following properties:
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(4) zitk, k=1,2,…,K are exogenous variables that influence FDI in country i in
period t. These control variables are discussed in the next section.
(5) uit is a corresponding disturbance term in country i in period t.
(6) β, δ, and γ are correspondingly defined parameters.
A variable that measures local governance infrastructure is based on nine
EBRD indices of reforms in the following categories: privatization, prices and trade
liberalization; infrastructure reform, competitiveness and restructuring of enterprises;
and financial sector reform.18 A simple average of all indices is taken to produce an







* is a weighted average of indices of local governance in the
neighboring countries. It can be interpreted as an index of regional governance for a
country i.
In general, higher presence of multinational companies can have an impact on
quality of governance, which means that constructed indices of local and regional are
potentially endogenous. However, the uniqueness of investigated countries was that
18 EBRD changed methodology of measuring reforms in legal sector from single index to two indices:
one measuring effectiveness and one measuring extensiveness. Moreover, reform in legal system index
is not available for all countries and all years, so we decided not to include it into the analysis.
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institutional changes at the early stage were driven by political shock of the
breakdown of the Soviet Union. As countries diverged in their institutional
development, the primary factor that explained variations of institutional changes
across transition countries were the degree of entrenchment of the Socialist formal
institutions in everyday life through their influence on informal institutions, customs
and traditions (Beck and Laeven, 2005). The second factor that also played an
important role was a structure of economy. Countries that had a high share of
resource-extracting industries in GDP performed poorly in the development of good
institutions.
To estimate the model parameters, a three step Generalized Method of
Moment (GMM) procedure is applied, which is described in the Appendix A.
Control variables
Market size and potential
Multinational companies prefer to locate production facilities where the big
markets are (Brenton et al., 1999; Head and Mayer, 2004; Amiti and Javorcik, 2005).
The log of GDP and the log of population proxy for the market size and potential as
factors that influences FDI inflow. A bigger market is necessary to exploit economies
of scale and more efficient use of resources through bigger market potential and
supplier access. Populous countries are more attractive for multinational companies
that search for new markets for their production. Therefore, coefficients for both
variables are expected to be positive.
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Openness to trade and trade barriers
Openness of the economy is also mentioned as a factor that affects FDI
inflows. As traditionally used in the literature (Janicki and Wunnava, 2004; Clausing
and Dorobantu, 2005), openness to trade is proxied by a ratio of export and import to
GDP, (export + import)/GDP, as an independent variable. We also include a direct
measure of trade barriers: a country import tariff rate averaged over t=1,2,…,T. High
barriers to trade and other protectionists policies reduce market and supplier access
and have a negative impact on FDI.
Natural Resources and EU market access
Because of their heterogeneity, transition countries have different sectoral
composition of FDI. To account for high volume of investment in oil and gas
industries in Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, a dummy for a
natural resource rich country is included. An EU19 dummy is also included to control
for proximity and access to the European Union market.
Other country-specific characteristics
The literature also mentions following factors that can affect FDI: the log of
GDP in 1991 to control for the differences in initial conditions (DeMelo et al., 1997);
US long term interest rate to control for the effect of big developed economies on the
19 We included all Eastern and Central European countries and Baltic States from our dataset. These
countries are either members of EU or are scheduled to become members. In contrast to the
Commonwealth of Independent States, these countries are more integrated into the European Union
and have a better market access to the European Market.
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FDI supply in emerging markets; and the number of telephone landlines per 100
people to measure quality of physical infrastructure (Campos and Kinoshita, 2003),
the distance from Brussels as another control for proximity to the EU. Neither of
those factors appeared significant and was not included in the base model.
Weighting matrices
A spillover effect of one country on another is expected to be negatively related to
the distance between them. It has been suggested in the literature that the level
economic activity between firms located in different countries and regions is
negatively correlated with distance because of transportation costs, language and
cultural barriers, and the effects of political and economic unions. As a result,
neighboring countries tend to a have higher volume of economic and political
interactions and have a higher influence on each other than remote countries do.
First, weights between countries i and j, w*ij are defined to be the inverse of the
distance between them, where distance, dij, is defined as a distance between capitals
of the countries. Diagonal elements of this preliminary weighting matrix set equal to










































































in order to row normalize it,
i.e., the elements of each row sum to one20. The weighting matrix has the following
form:
An alternative specification of a weighting matrix was also considered where
we assume that there are no spillover effects of governance in, for example, Central
Asia on economic development of Central and Eastern European countries because of
their remoteness as well as weaker cultural and political ties. In particular, it was
assumed that only close enough countries influence each other's economic
performance and the spatial externality and correlation of errors do not spread outside
of the region where the country i is located21. Elements of the second weighting
matrix, W2, are proportional to the value of
gij
d/1 if countries i and j are from the
same region22 and are set equal to 0 otherwise. Diagonal elements are again set equal
to zero.
20 This technicality simplifies estimation. It also makes variables of local and regional governance
comparable in size.
21 As mentioned earlier, we defined regions as follows : Central and Eastern European region (Albania,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia); European
former Soviet Union region (Byelorussia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine);
and Central Asia and Caucus former Soviet Union region (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)
22 The coefficients of proportionality are chosen to normalize elements of each raw, so they sum to 1.
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After careful investigation, W2 had been chosen as the weighting matrix for
the base regression because – measured in terms of statistical significance of the
model coefficients - it captured existed spatial links better than W1. In particular, it
means that spatial spillovers are more pronounced within a certain region because of
strong economic and political ties and are weaker between different regions. As a
robustness check, the results with W1 are also presented in section 5.3.3 where the
alternative specification is tested.
Results and sensitivity analysis
Results: base spatial regression estimated by three step GMM procedure
It is a well-established fact that the quality of governance is an important
determinant of FDI in transition countries. These findings are confirmed by showing
that the coefficient of the index of local governance is positive and significant in all
regressions. Results for the base model specification (1) are presented in the Table 11.
To interpret the size of the effect, consider the following example. At the sample
average of the index of local governance, 2.6, and the value of the coefficient 1.01 in
the base regression, the elasticity of FDI with respect to the index of local governance
is 2.66.
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* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
b Standard errors in square brackets
c Fully weighted GMM estimation
d. Standard errors are asymptotic approximations
a The base specification model. Spatial estimation. Dependent variable is the log of inward
FDI. Elements of the weighting matrix are inversly proprtional to distance between
countries from the same region
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More importantly, the coefficient of the regional governance is also positive,
significant, and has the same order of magnitude as the local index of reforms. When
the base spatial model specification is estimated, the coefficient of the regional
governance is 0.88 that is not statistically different from the coefficient of local
governance. The positive coefficient of the regional governance infrastructure shows
that there is a positive spillover effect of improving governance in, for example,
Czech Republic on FDI inflow in Hungary, Poland and other neighboring countries
and vice versa. The elasticity of FDI in Czech Republic with respect to the index of
regional governance is 2.58.23 At the same time, a contribution of governance in each
particular country j to FDI in Czech Republic is proportional to the weight the
country j has. For example, Polish governance infrastructure enters the equation for
FDI in Czech Republic with the weight 0.18. Therefore, an improvement in local
governance in Poland by 1% increases FDI in Czech Republic24 by 0.54%.
Positive externality also points out to the importance of geographical location
on the economic development from the following standpoint: a country attracts more
FDI and enjoys higher positive effects generated by foreign companies if it is located
in a region where other countries have good economic institutions. However, it also
works in the opposite direction: economic development of a country located in a
region with poor governance is more problematic. In 2003, regional governance
infrastructure indices in Hungry and Kyrgyzstan were equal to 3.1 and 2.7. Had
Kyrgyzstan been located where Hungary is, it would increase foreign direct
23 Elasticity is calculated for the sample average value of regional governance for Czech Republic 2.9
and the coefficient of regional governance 0.88
24 Average index of local governance in Poland was 3.41 during the discussed period.
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investment to Kyrgyz republic by 14%. The bad news is that Kyrgyzstan can not
move out of Central Asia to improve its economic situation. However, a larger role
for international organizations and regional unions can help to solve externality
problems and substantially improve regional economic situation.
Both variables that capture a market size and potential effects are positive and
significant. Elasticities of FDI with respect to GDP and population are 0.29 and 0.53
subsequently. According to our results, openness to trade measured as a ratio of
export and import to GDP is one of the key factors that explain FDI inflow.
Countries, more integrated in international trade of resources and products, receive
more FDI. Elasticity of FDI with respect to openness to trade is equal to 1.02 in the
base regression. Another trade related variable - average tariff rate - measures a
degree of protection of local markets from international competition. It is negative
and significant in the main specification in column (1) of Table 11.
The coefficient of the natural resource dummy is positive and significant. On
average, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan received almost seven
times more FDI per year than other CIS countries, even though they did not have
better economic policies and reform strategies.25 In the light of high volatility of
energy prices investors would like to secure valuable natural resources for current and
future usage despite political and economic risks. This result tells that countries rich
in natural resources have comparative advantage in attracting FDI. On the other hand,
25 Average net FDI in oil and gas rich countries was 1.4 billion $US per year. All other countries of
former Soviet Union on average received 200 million $US per year. At the same time, period average
indices of local governance for natural resource rich countries and for other FSU countries were
2.1.and 2.5 consequently.
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these countries have lower than average quality of governance. It might indicate that
dependence on export of natural resources reduce incentives to invest in better
governance and lead to lower levels of local governance infrastructure. The
coefficient of the EU dummy is negative and significant. Again, taking a stand that
geographical location is important, it can be explained as a disadvantage for countries
that are located further from main economic centers such as European Union.
At the bottom of Table 11, estimates for the coefficient of the spatial lag ρ and
standard errors σv and σ1 that were calculated at the second stage of the estimation
procedure are presented. The spatial lag has a positive value,0.26, but is not
statistically different from zero.
Market access and regional governance
Better governance is positively associated with economic growth and GDP per
capita. Higher levels of GDP and GDP per capita in neighboring countries, in turn,
can generate regional agglomeration and market access effects, and induce higher
inward FDI. Therefore, the main finding that regional governance has a positive
effect on local inward FDI may be due to the fact that we do not take into account the
effect of the regional GDP or GDP per capita.
The regional GDP and regional GDP per capita are defined similar to the
definition of regional governance infrastructure as distance-weighted averages of
GDP and GDP per capita of other countries in the region and estimate the model with
additional controls. The results are presented in Table 12. First, it is important to
check if a positive effect of higher regional GDP on local FDI inflow can be found
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when the effect of regional governance is omitted from the regression. The model in
column (2) includes the regional GPD and excludes the index of regional governance.
The coefficient of the regional GDP is positive, but not significant. The model in
column (3) includes both local and regional governance along with the regional GDP.
The coefficient of the regional GDP is negative and significant. Therefore, as was
expected, omitting regional governance creates an upward bias in the regression that
evaluates an impact of regional GDP on local FDI. When positive effects of better
governance and gains from trade on inward FDI are taken into account, higher
regional GDP has a crowding-out effect since multinational enterprises prefer to
invest in nearby countries with higher level of GDP. The same exercise is repeated
for the regional GDP per capita as a measure of the attractiveness of the regional
market. Results are presented in columns (4) and (5), in Table 12. The coefficient of
the regional GDP per capita is not significant and changes sign from positive in the
model (4) to negative in the model (5).
It might be the case that a positive impact of bigger regional markets on FDI
has not been found in the previous paragraph because the market size effect primarily
comes through trade channels. To check this hypothesis, models in columns (6)-(9)
exclude openness to trade as an explanatory variable. Indeed, higher coefficients of
the regional GDP and GDP per capita are observed in models presented in columns
(6) and (7). The effect, however, disappears when regional governance is included in
the regressions presented in columns (8) and (9).
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Table 12 Regional governance and market potential
Dependent variable lnFDI lnFDI lnFDI lnFDI lnFDI lnFDI lnFDI lnFDI
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Local governance 1.24*** 0.98*** 1.24*** 0.97*** 1.35*** 0.99*** 1.34*** 1.00***
[0.14] [0.13] [0.14] [0.13] [0.14] [0.13] [0.14] [0.14]
Regional governance 1.05*** 1.00*** 1.22*** 1.14***
[0.20] [0.22] [0.19] [0.21]
Log GDP 0.45*** 0.31*** 0.37** 0.35*** 0.33** 0.25** 0.21 0.25**
[0.14] [0.11] [0.15] [0.12] [0.14] [0.11] [0.15] [0.12]
Log Population 0.44** 0.51*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.43** 0.50*** 0.53*** 0.50***
[0.18] [0.14] [0.18] [0.15] [0.19] [0.14] [0.19] [0.15]
Regional GDP -0.03 -0.32** 0.25 -0.2
[0.18] [0.14] [0.17] [0.14]
Regional GDP per capita 0.23 -0.23 0.58*** -0.09
[0.22] [0.20] [0.21] [0.20]
Openness to trade 1.90*** 1.22*** 1.6841*** 1.12***
[0.44] [0.41] [0.4452] [0.41]
Average tariff -0.009 -0.0345 -0.03 -0.0369 -0.0565** -0.0648*** -0.0755*** -0.0675***
[0.0283] [0.0222] [0.03] [0.0243] [0.0276] [0.0199] [0.0279] [0.0216]
Subsantial resources of oil or natural gas 1.47*** 1.56*** 1.69*** 1.63*** 1.98*** 1.84*** 2.18*** 1.92***
1=yes 0=no [0.31] [0.24] [0.33] [0.27] [0.31] [0.23] [0.31] [0.25]
EU 0.62* 0.91*** 0.54 0.85*** 0.54 0.88*** 0.44 0.82***
1=yes 0=no [0.33] [0.26] [0.33] [0.27] [0.35] [0.26] [0.34] [0.27]
Constant -1.33 5.58* -2.7 -0.15 -4.34 4.79 -1.47 0.93
[4.01] [3.19] [1.73] [1.42] [4.22] [3.19] [1.77] [1.36]
ρb 0.38 0.31 0.38 0.3 0.41 0.29 0.4 0.29
σν 0.41 0.4 0.41 0.4 0.42 0.4 0.41 0.4
σ1 1.58 0.86 1.54 0.94 1.76 0.89 1.63 0.95
Observations 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a Standard errors in square brackets
b Fully weighted GMM estimation
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It is also interesting to note that models that do not include regional
governance as a determinant of inward FDI have ρ, a measure of unobservable spatial
spillovers, higher as compared to the models that do include regional governance.
Overall, the main finding of the positive effect of the regional governance
infrastructure on local inward FDI is unchanged. Its coefficient is positive and
significant in all regressions where it is included. This result demonstrates importance
of including a measure of regional institutions when studying the effect of market
access on the location of FDI.
Sensitivity analysis
As shown in previous section, better regional governance has a large, positive,
and significant effect on inward FDI. However, there are important concerns on how
robust the results are. Three potential problems were identified: endogeneity of
explanatory variables, omitted variable biases, and the sensitivity of results to the
choice of the weighting matrix. This section will investigate each of these problems.
Endogeneity of explanatory variables
Some of the explanatory variables can be positively correlated with the error
terms or potentially can be endogenous. We have a particular concern that inward
FDI positively influences GDP and openness to trade which can lead to an upward
bias of the coefficient of regional governance infrastructure. This problem is
addressed by re-estimating the base model in column (1) in several other
specifications. Table 13 presents the results of alternative model specifications. Lags
of log GDP and openness to trade are included in the model in column (10). In the
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model (11), all potentially endogenous variables are excluded from the regression.
The model (12) uses log of the household expenditures as another proxy for the
market size.26 Finally, the log of GDP is instrumented by the spatial lag of the log of
GDP and openness to trade is instrumented by import tariff rate and the spatial lag of
openness to trade. The results of the second stage of the instrumental variable
regression are presented in the model (13).
26 We dropped Turkmenistan from the regression since it does not have the household expenditure data
for several years.
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Table 13 Endogeneity check
Dependent variable lnFDI lnFDI lnFDI lnFDI
(10) (11) (12) (13)
Local governance 1.03*** 1.08*** 0.86*** 1.13***
[0.13] a [0.13] [0.15] [0.15]
Regional governance 0.81*** 1.16*** 1.12*** 0.89***
[0.20] [0.17] [0.22] [0.20]
Log GDP 0.28** 0.07
[0.11] [0.16]
Log Population 0.48*** 0.79*** 0.48*** 0.66***
[0.15] [0.07] [0.15] [0.16]
Openness to trade 0.82** 0.69 1.17
[0.36] [0.44] [0.78]
Average tariff -0.038*** -0.085*** -0.070***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Log Household Expenditures 0.32**
[0.13]
Subsantial resources of oil or natural gas 1.85*** 2.18*** 1.95*** 1.88***
1=yes 0=no [0.24] [0.20] [0.27] [0.25]
EU 0.71*** 1.13*** 0.78*** 0.87***
1=yes 0=no [0.27] [0.21] [0.27] [0.31]
Constant 0.24 1.48 -0.92 1.48
[1.30] [1.06] [1.41] [1.73]
ρ 0.2b 0.29 0.34 0.28
σν 0.24 0.4 0.38 0.41
σ1 1.07 1.05 1 1.32
Observations 240 264 253 264
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a Standard errors in square brackets
b Fully weighted GMM estimation
Dependent variable is the log of fdi inflow in current $US. Weighting matrix elements are inversly
proportional to the distance between capitals of the countries from the same region
Overall, the positive and significant effect of regional governance does not
change in any of alternative model specifications. The coefficients of local
governance, population, natural resources, and CIS are all significant and robust to
77
the changes in the model specification. On the other hand, openness to trade is not
significant in the model (4) and (5) while average tariff is not significant in the model
(2). Log of GDP is positive but not significant in the instrumental variable
specification.
Omitted variable bias
To check for omitted variables, several other regressions with more control
variables are estimated (Table 14, models 14 - 18). In model (14), a log of GDP in
1991 as a proxy for dependence on initial conditions is included because the literature
(DeMelo et al., 1997) mentions that the different starting points of transition countries
may be responsible for variations in their economic performance. The results in the
table indicate that it is not significant. Model (15) includes US long term interest rate
to control for crowding-out effect of investment in developed countries on FDI in
transition countries. The variable is not significant. Model (16) includes number of
phone lines as a measure of physical infrastructure as discussed in the literature
(Campos and Kinoshita, 2003). Investment in public infrastructure is accounted for as
a part of the index of local governance. It may explain why the coefficient is not
significant and has the “wrong” sign. Model (17) includes the log of the distance of
the country’s capital to Brussels to control for proximity to the EU. The model in
column (18) includes all variables mentioned above and joint significance of
additional coefficients is tested. The results of the test indicate that all three additional
variables are jointly not significant.
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Table 14 Spatial estimation. Check for omitted variables
Dependent variable lnFDI lnFDI lnFDI lnFDI lnFDI
(14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Local governance 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.01*** 1.00*** 1.02***
[0.14] [0.13] [0.13] [0.14] [0.14]
Regional governance 0.86*** 0.91*** 0.88*** 0.89*** 0.92***
[0.21] [0.21] [0.19] [0.20] [0.23]
Log GDP 0.33* 0.29** 0.30** 0.31** 0.35*
[0.17] [0.12] [0.14] [0.14] [0.19]
Log Population 0.55*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.53**
[0.16] [0.15] [0.17] [0.16] [0.22]
Openness to trade 1.04** 1.02** 1.04** 1.04** 1.04**
[0.42] [0.40] [0.45] [0.41] [0.46]
Average tariff -0.0488** -0.0489** -0.0486** -0.0477** -0.0490**
[0.0222] [0.0222] [0.0222] [0.0228] [0.0232]
Subsantial resources of oil or natural gas 1.80*** 1.80*** 1.78*** 1.77*** 1.78***
1=yes 0=no [0.23] [0.23] [0.24] [0.26] [0.28]
EU 0.74*** 0.73*** 0.75*** -0.77*** -0.74***
1=yes 0=no [0.27] [0.27] [0.26] [0.27] [0.29]
Log GDP in 1991 -0.0496 -0.0591
[0.1760] [0.2087]
US interest rate 0.0301 0.0402
[0.0765] [0.0819]
Number of phone lines per 100 inhabitants -0.0019 0.0006
[0.0106] [0.0123]
Log Distance to Brussels 0.0591 0.0768
[0.2615] [0.2724]
Constant -0.89 -1.2 -1.03 -1.5533 -1.9242
[1.29] [1.42] [1.39] [2.9755] [3.3854]
ρb 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
σν 0.4 0.44 0.4 0.4 0.4
σ1 0.99 1 0.96 1 0.93
Observations 264 264 264 264 264
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a Standard errors in square brackets
b Fully weighted GMM estimation
Dependent variable is the log of fdi inflow in current $US. Weighting matrix elements are inversly proportional
to the distance between capitals of the countries from the same region
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The mentioned modifications of the base model do not change our main
findings about the sign and significance of the coefficients of local and regional
governance infrastructure. The coefficient of the local index is close to 1 in all
specifications, while the coefficient of the regional index varies in a range from 0.86
to 0.93.
Choice of weights
To check the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the weighting matrix,
we tried an alternative specification of the model:
tttttt uzindexWindexWindexFDI ++++= γδδβ 2211ln
where W1 and W2 are the weighting matrices defined in the section 4.
. Table 15 presents the spatial estimation results where two measures of the
regional governance are included. The first index is weighted by the inverse of the
distance between countries and does not take into account potential regional effects. It
is negative but not significant. The second index of regional governance that is
weighted by the inverse of the distance between countries located in the same region
has a coefficient that is positive and significant.
The results indicate that the externality effect is not simply a linear function of
the inverse of the distant between countries. An impact of, for example, Central and
Eastern European countries on development of countries located outside of the region
is small relative to the effect within the region. Additional research is necessary to
specify the weighting matrix that will take into account such factors as common
border, common language, cultural and political ties.
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Regional governance calculated with weights inversly prpoprtional 1.34**
to distance between countries from the same region [0.62]
Regional governance calculated with weights inversly prpoprtional -0.56






















* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
b Standard errors in square brackets
c Fully weighted GMM estimation
d. Standard errors are asymptotic approximations
a Spatial estimation. Dependent variable is the log of inward FDI.
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Conclusions
It is a well-established fact that countries with better governance attract more
foreign direct investment. This paper demonstrates that regional governance is also an
important determinant of inward FDI. Transition countries have significant regional
differences in levels of governance infrastructure and FDI across regions. The
variations of inward FDI can be explained by the variations in levels of regional
governance infrastructure across regions. Better regional governance creates a
positive externality of higher FDI inflows. The spillover effect of regional
infrastructure on FDI is highly significant and comparable in size to the effect of
governance inside the country.
The positive externality of better regional governance directly comes from
better regional governance to more local inward FDI. As the results indicate, better
governance in the region is more important factor for the choice of FDI location than
bigger market potential. The results are robust to the choice of control variables and
weighting matrix specification.
A population size, EU dummy, and substantial resources of oil and gas are
explanatory variables that influence inward FDI and are robust in all model
specifications. CIS countries that are rich in natural resources attract more FDI than
other CIS countries even though they perform worse in terms of the development of
the local governance infrastructure. Moreover, all CIS countries have additional
disadvantage compared to Central and Eastern Europe because they are located
further from European Union and are less integrated into the European Market.
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Chapter 3: Spatial interdependence and relative geographical
location as determinants of institutional development
Introduction
The majority of empirical papers that investigate cross-country differences in
economic performance ignore the spatial dimension. Econometric models introduced
in these papers study determinants of economic and institutional development within
a country and have an implicit assumption that borders isolate countries from each
other.27 Under this assumption, good economic and political development in Croatia,
which has made a considerable progress in improving its governance, has nothing to
do with the fact that it is located in Central Europe, shares borders with Slovenia and
Hungary, and have historical and cultural ties with Northern Italy. By and large,
development is determined by some country specific factors and government policies
according to these models. Likewise, the poor economic and political development of
Ethiopia has nothing to do with the fact that it is located in a region where other
countries also have economic and political problems and have a long history of
unsuccessful reforms and political crises.
This is an unrealistic assumption that should be tested empirically for the
following reasons. First of all, there are continuous interactions of formal and
informal institutions across countries. It is natural to assume that these interactions
are stronger for geographically close countries, especially for countries that share
common borders and that are culturally close in terms of language, religion, social
27 E.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Hall and Jones 1999; Barro, 1999
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norms, and traditions. Borders themselves are subject to change, currently
independent countries (e.g., former members of the Soviet Union or the Austrian
Empire) shaped their governance under influence of political and economic
institutions that have long ceased to exist but still have an impact on
contemporaneous institutions. Secondly, economic globalization and the worldwide
spread of the Internet increase mobility of capital and labor, thus allowing free
exchange of information and ideas that reduce barriers between countries.
In the world of imperfect information and uncertainty, a benevolent government
can learn from experience of successful policies and reforms carried out in other
countries. Having more sources of information, it can emulate good governance
practices and produce less uncertain outcomes easier than ever. Even if one think
about a government as rent-seeking bureaucrats, more educated and informed
population that has higher labor mobility will put a pressure on government officials
when their performance and quality of public services are inferior to those in the
neighboring countries. Therefore, the assumption of exclusively internal factors that
determine institutional development should be softened by testing whether economic,
political, and cultural links from abroad have an impact on internal institutional
development.
This paper introduces external influence of governance in the neighboring
countries on governance inside a country, which is also called as policy diffusion
mechanism or spatial autoregressive process of governance development. The policy
diffusion is empirically tested based on the indices of voice and accountability and
governance effectiveness calculated by Kaufman et al. (2005) for 150 countries in
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1996-2004. The governance diffusion is modeled as a spatial autoregressive process,
which treats neighboring countries as spatially connected units. Spatial econometrics,
pioneered by Cliff and Ord (1981) and further developed by Anselin (2003), Florax
and Vlist (2003), Kelejian and Prucha (1999, 2004), investigates relationships
between close spatial units (e.g., countries) in a similar fashion as time series analysis
investigates relationships between observations from close time periods.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. First, some historical
episodes when changes in governance structure had a strong spatial component are
discussed. Second, an econometric model that includes the spatial autoregressive
component is built and the estimation strategy and econometric technique is
discussed. Third, main results are presented and robustness checks are presented.
Finally, conclusions are drawn and possible extensions of the model are discussed.
Spatial dimensions of institutional and economic development
There is growing empirical literature that supports the idea that better
institutions are correlated with economic development.28 More importantly, there is
evidence that causality goes from improved governance to higher economic growth.
For example, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (AJR 2001 and 2002) demonstrated
that institutions protecting property rights, established by European settlers in less
developed areas of North America and Australia, more than 300 years ago, helped
those countries to grow more rapidly than more developed and populated areas in
Africa, South America, and Asia. Other studies that looked at the determinants of
economic growth and established an important link from better institutions to higher
28 See, for example, Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), Barro (1999), Hall and Jones (1999)
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economic growth include Easterly and Levine (1997), Rodrik, Subramanian, and
Trebbi (2004), and Beck and Laeven (2005).
An important direction of research that naturally follows from this observation
is to investigate fundamental factors that determine quality of governance. From the
policy perspective, it is especially critical to investigate how political, economic, and
cultural factors influence fluctuations of the quality of governance in the short run.
Some lessons can be drawn from success stories such as the process of transition in
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that demonstrate the possibility of
considerable improvements in the quality of governance and economic development
in a relatively short period.
In the beginning of the 90’s, all CEE countries faced a difficult task of
economic and political transformation from the command type of economy and
communist system of government to the market economy and democratic system of
government. CEE countries came through a difficult and painful process of reforms
yet showed significant improvements in their political and economic institutions.
Many countries of the region joined the European Union and have gradually
converged in quality of governance to reach higher standards of the older EU
members during the last fifteen years. More strikingly, there is an increasing
diversion in quality of governance within countries of the former Soviet Bloc. As
Figure 9 demonstrates, members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS –
the 12 former republics of the Soviet Union) were not able to replicate the success of
CEE countries. The current picture is even more striking if one looks further in
history, when these countries were members of the Soviet Bloc. Even though CEE
86
and CIS countries had similar starting positions, they have diverged substantially in
the development path in a period of less than twenty years.
Some policy lessons can be drawn from the negative experience in other
regions such as Africa. As Easterly and Levine (1997) pointed out: “Africa’s
economic history since 1960 is the classical definition of tragedy: potential
unfulfilled, with disastrous consequences… On average, real per capita GDP did not
grow in Africa over the 1965–1990 period, while, in East Asia and the Pacific, per
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Figure 9 Quality of governance in the selected regions
Note: index of quality of governance is a simple average of six governance indicators by regions
constructed by Kaufman et al. (2005).
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What causes the difference between development of some transition countries
and the development of African countries? Why did some countries succeed in
improving governance and generating steady growth while others failed to do so?
Some idiosyncratic factors partially explain the difference in institution building.
Easterly and Levine (1997), for example, demonstrated that Africa’s poor governance
and bad government policies are partially caused by high ethnic diversity. Beck and
Laeven (2005) have shown that dependence on natural resources and the length of
period under Socialist rule explained a large part of variations in institutional quality
for transition countries. Some researchers indicated that geographical location and
climate are important determinants of economic development that can explain
geographical clustering of countries (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1999). However,
the geographical factors are fixed and can not explain rapid changes in economic and
institutional development that are spatially correlated. The fact that even the slowest
reformers in the CEE region made remarkable progress on the way towards market-
oriented reforms and institutions, in a period of 15 years and achieved good economic
growth, while most African countries were not able to reform for 40 years requires
additional explanation.
An important determinant of the quality of domestic governance that is
missing from many empirical studies is the impact of governance diffusion i.e., the
impact of governance and its determinants in the neighboring countries29 on
governance inside a specific country. Geographically, close countries share strong
cultural, social, and economic ties throughout their whole history. They also have
29 We refer to works in the field of Economics. There is extensive literature in Political Science on
policy diffusion and spatial effects of government policies and reforms. (Simmons and Elkins, 2004;
O'Loughlin et al., 1998)
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contemporaneous economic and political relationships with each other. As a result,
institutions are endogenously determined by interactions of governance institutions of
all countries in a particular region. The policy diffusion can explain the geographical
clustering of countries in terms of quality of governance and shed some light on why
there has been a persistence of bad governance in some geographic regions e.g.,
Africa and why it has been relatively easy for Central European countries to reform in
a short period.30
Omitting the policy diffusion effect can lead to a biased estimation in a
regression that studies determinants of good government and its impact on economic
growth. Many African countries, for example, have poor governance, low income per
capita, high ethnological fractionalization, and French origin of legal system. They
are also located in a region where most of their neighbors have poor governance and
low income per capita, as well. As demonstrated in this paper, a "bad neighborhood"
effect (e.g., Cutler and Glaezer, 1997) of low regional GDP and bad regional
governance reinforces the impact of adverse factors inside the country and makes bad
governance more persistent. The omitted spatial lag of regional governance, in turn,
leads to biases in estimation of other variables that are also correlated with "bad
location" e.g., high ethnolinguistic diversity and French origin of legal system. High
ethnolingistic fractionalization by itself does not cause political and economic
instability. The European region, for example, is highly fractured both ethnically and
30 In our opinion, proximity to the European Union helped to reform CEE countries more rapidly and
smoothed the transition period. Out of all transition countries, the most successfully reformed countries
are the countries that are located closer to the old EU members. On the other hand, Central Asia
countries, which are located the furthest from the EU, are the least successful reformers. Similarly,
lack of economically strong democratic states in Africa makes it more difficult to develop and improve
governance in each country of the region.
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linguistically, but it is more culturally homogeneous and is highly economically
developed. This paper demonstrate that when measures of regional economic
development and religious affiliation (cultural proxies) are controlled, the negative
impact of ethnolingistic fractionalizations becomes insignificant.
Diffusion of governance: Europe before and after the revolutions of 1989
"Poland—10 Years; Hungary—10 Months; East Germany—
10 Weeks; Czechoslovakia—10 Days; Romania—10 Hours."”
A sign in Prague in 1989
Previous discussion can be illustrated by a historical episode of the end of the
Cold War, in 1989-1991, when initial very limited reforms in Poland and Hungary
produced a “cascade effect”, which had a very clear spatial pattern, and influenced all
countries of the Communist bloc. Earlier movers, e.g., Poland and Hungary, carried
out their reforms under limited information and high uncertainty on the optimal set of
reforms and their expected outcomes. It was much easier to reform governance for
any subsequent mover due to reduced uncertainty and positive experience of the early
movers which was an example of an informational cascade (Banerjee, 1992). The
cascade, however, had a clear geographical pattern because the population in the
later-reformed countries put an additional pressure on their decision makers and
demanded changes similar to ones already made in earlier reformed countries. Which,
in turn, made it more difficult to maintain status quo for ruling Communist parties.
This section elaborates on this point and gives a historical background.
During the second half of the 20th century, Europe was split into two parts and
featured distinctly different economic and political institutions. There were
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substantial differences in the quality of life and political freedoms between countries
of the Eastern and Western Bloc located in the same geographical region despite
common historical and cultural backgrounds. Artificial barriers to prevent migration
of people to the west and diffusion of political and economic institutions to the east
were required to keep these differences intact. The Iron Curtain31 was the barrier that,
for almost half-a-century, helped to protect Eastern Bloc countries from Western
European influence. Economically, the policy of the Iron Curtain took the form of
high trade barriers and capital controls and thus prevented free trade and movement
of capital between country-members of the two blocs. Politically, the Iron Curtain
was a heavily guarded border with one of the highest concentration of military forces.
In fact, the Berlin Wall, a symbol of the Cold War, was build, in 1961, to prevent
mass-migration of East Germans to the West. “In the years between 1949 and 1961,
about 2.5 million East Germans had fled from East to West Germany, including
steadily rising numbers of skilled workers, professionals, and intellectuals…East
Germany built a barrier to close off East Germans' access to West Berlin…By the
1980s this system of walls, electrified fences, and fortifications extended 28 miles (45
km) through Berlin, dividing the two parts of the city, and extended a further 75 miles
(120 km) around West Berlin, separating it from the rest of East Germany.”32
Culturally, to prevent the proliferation of ideas and cultural exchange, interactions
between common people were very limited due to restrictions on freedom of
31 “The political, military, and ideological barrier erected by the Soviet Union after World War II to
seal off itself and its dependent eastern European allies from open contact with the West and other
noncommunist areas.” Iron Curtain. (2006). In Encyclopædia Britannica.
32 Berlin Wall. (2006). In Encyclopædia Britannica.
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movement.33 Moreover, government controlled media in the Eastern bloc countries
provided biased information about everyday life of ordinary people in the Western
bloc countries.
By the middle of 1980s, it became clear that the Eastern bloc countries were
not able to keep up with the economic development of the Western bloc and reforms
were necessary to fix inefficiencies in the socialist economy. Some steps were taken
to soften economic and cultural barriers and to carry out partial market-oriented
reforms. The initial objective was to open up communist countries, a little bit, in
order to bring modern technologies and products from the West but not to give in to
pressure of political and economic freedoms on a large scale. However, the
subsequent events revealed that even the slight softening of the barriers opened up a
Pandora’s box of more efficient and socially attractive economic and political
institutions of the West. The fall of the Berlin Wall, on November 9, 1989, as the
symbol of European unification, in fact was just the last element in a chain of events
that removed the Iron Curtain.
A very slow and carefully managed process of economic and political reforms
that started in Poland and Hungary in the early 80’s and, in the Soviet Union in the
middle of the 80’s, went out of control in 1989. In September of 1989, the first non-
communist government was formed in Poland. In October, the Hungarian Communist
party ceased to exist and the new government announced a course toward
democratization, multi-party elections, and economic reforms. These events had an
important impact on the political changes in neighboring countries, East Germany in
33 For example, to go on vacation or business trip to another country, in addition to visa, a citizen of the
Soviet Union should have gone through a lengthy process that included obtaining permission from a
local branch of the Communist Party and presenting three letters of recommendation.
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particular. “…a reformist Hungarian government began allowing East Germans to
escape to the West through Hungary's newly opened border with Austria. By the fall,
thousands of East Germans had followed this route, while thousands of others sought
asylum in the West German embassies in Prague and Warsaw, demanding that they
be allowed to emigrate to West Germany. At the end of September, Genscher, still
West Germany's foreign minister, arranged for their passage to West Germany, but
another wave of refugees from East Germany soon took their place. Mass
demonstrations in the streets of Leipzig and other East German cities defied the
authorities and demanded reforms…On the evening of November 9, Günter
Schabowski, a communist functionary, mistakenly announced at a televised news
conference that the government would allow East Germans unlimited passage to West
Germany, effective “immediately.” While the government had in fact meant to
require East Germans to apply for exit visas during normal working hours, this was
widely interpreted as a decision to open the Berlin Wall that evening, so crowds
gathered and demanded to pass into West Berlin. Unprepared, the border guards let
them go. In a night of revelry tens of thousands of East Germans poured through the
crossing points in the wall and celebrated their new freedom with rejoicing West
Berliners.”34 Subsequently, revolutions in the Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania
followed. Finally, the process of changes moved further eastward to the Baltic States,
in 1990, and ended with the breakdown of the Soviet Union after an unsuccessful
military coup, in 1991.
A phenomenon of very rapid institutional changes is not new in world history.
The revolutions of 1848 in Europe, which had a very deep impact on the development
34 Germany. (2006). In Encyclopædia Britannica.
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of the European countries, also had distinct spatial structure. The first European
revolution, in 1848, occurred in Sicily and spread across the whole of Central Europe
during the same year. Only two countries, United Kingdom and Russia,35 did not
experience strong revolutionary upheaval were the countries located at the
geographical periphery of the European continent. Another historical episode that had
a clear spatial pattern was the processes of decolonization of Latin America in 19th
century, South East Asia in the first part of the 20th century, and Africa in the second
part of the 20th century.
Is it possible to explain deep economic and institutional changes that
happened in a short period in each of the Eastern Bloc countries by some internal,
country-specific factors alone? Obviously, each successful revolution in early
reformed countries made it more likely that similar reforms would succeed in the later
reformed countries producing an informational cascade. At the same time,
neighboring countries experience similar political and economic processes and share
close cultural and historical ties. Political forces, responsible for political changes in
Poland in June of 1989, had some impact on other countries of the region, as well.
Therefore, a spatial aspect of the changes that started, in 1989, and ended with the
breakdown of the Soviet Union can be modeled as spatial shocks transmitted from
country-to-country and the long-term forces that were shaping political and economic
institutions in the region for centuries. This paper is not going to separate these two
effects at this point but would like to point out that this issue requires careful
investigation of its own.
35The Kingdom of Poland, the most western part of the Russian Empire, experienced a series of minor
unrests inspired by a group of Polish immigrants in Paris. Those attempts did not bring any significant
results but led to an immigration wave from Poland to the Western Europe and United States.
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Measurement of governance and exogenous covariates
Governance matters IV: governance indicators for 1996-2004
It is not sufficient to measure quality of institutions in one dimension because
the structure and scope of governance varies widely from country to country and
there are no established standards for the ideal system of governance. This problem is
dealt by looking at two different dimensions of governance quality, which evaluate
governance in terms of political competitiveness and government efficiency as well
as checking for spatial effects in each of those dimensions.
First, it is important to know how institutions of governance are formed and
monitored by the population. The ideal index that measures this dimension of
governance takes into account the following: How open and competitive is the
selection process? Does population have access to full and unbiased information on
the day-to-day work of elected officials? Is there equal access of all spectrum of
population and organization to mass media? If political process has low barriers to
entry and all involved parties and organizations have equal opportunities then the
most efficient institutions representing interest of significant groups of populations
are formed. Therefore, positive answers to these questions ensure that the moral
hazard problem of selecting and monitoring government officials is minimized and
interests of minorities are protected.
Second, it is essential to measure the effectiveness of government and
regulatory organizations in forming their goals and implementing their policies.
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Governments formed by a non-democratic procedure and representing interests of the
elite score low on political competitiveness; still they can be very efficient in
implementing policies that protect their own interests. On the other hand, a
democratically elected government might have coordination problems in setting a
policy agenda and implementing those policies in open but highly diverse societies
that have highly heterogeneous interests.
Kaufmann et al. (2005) identified three dimensions of governance motivated
by a broad definition of governance as the traditions and institutions by which
authority in a country is exercised: (1) the process by which governments are
selected, monitored, and replaced; (2) the capacity of the government to effectively
formulate and implement sound policies; (3) the respect of citizens and the state for
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. This paper
concentrates on evaluating governance in the first two dimensions: political openness
and effectiveness of government.36 Therefore, the following governance indicators
were chosen.
(1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced:
“Voice and Accountability” includes a number of indicators measuring
various aspects of the political process, civil liberties, and political rights.
These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to
36 Kaufmann et al. (2005) introduced six governance indicators, two indicators per each dimension. We
have found that spatial correlation is present for any indicator. In our study we present and discuss
results for two indicators of governance, because we think that they are sufficient to measure quality of
governance in two dimensions. The rest of indicators are highly correlated with two indicators we
present in the paper.
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participate in the selection of governments. It also includes indicators
measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in
monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions.
Conditional on high standards of selection and monitoring of government
officials in a region, population of any country within the region forms
expectations for comparable quality of governance inside the country. These
expectations, in turn, put pressure on the government officials to maintain
comparable level of voice and accountability in the country.
(2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement
sound policies:
“Government Effectiveness” combines responses on the quality of public
service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil
servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and
the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. The focus of this
index is on “inputs” required for the government to be able to produce and
implement good policies and deliver public goods. A government
effectiveness index measures the "supply side" of governance. The policy
diffusion effect from the "supply side" comes from the fact that a population
judges its officials based on relative performance and compares local
government effectiveness with government effectiveness of their neighbors. In
addition, benevolent government officials learn from positive policy
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experiments of their neighbors and imitate those policies that are most
successful.
Covariates of governance
Literature on determinants of governance grew substantially in the last
decade. Recent empirical studies that directly investigate determinants of good
institutions include La Porta et al. (1999), Treisman (2000), Adsera, Boix, and Payne
(2003), and AJR (2005). In addition, there was an extensive literature that
investigated the contribution of good governance to economic growth by looking at
the determinants of governance as a first stage of instrumental variable estimation
(Easterly and Levine 1997, AJR 2000 and 2001, Beck and Laeven 2005)
La Porta et al. (1999) outlined three broad categories of determinants of
institutional development as economic, political, and cultural. Economic theories
suggest that new institutions emerge when it is efficient to create them. As countries
get richer, they can afford a wider choice of institutional arrangements and more
complex structure of government that are usually not available for poor countries
(Demsetz, 1967; North 1981). As an economy grows and develops its markets,
opportunities for new institutions become feasible and economically efficient. For
example, development of modern financial system requires establishment of
regulatory institutions that control and facilitate market transactions. Political theories
(North, 1990; Olson, 1993) look at the conflict of interests between different groups
of population (e.g. different ethnic and religious groups) and at the structural
organization of a government. Cultural theories (Weber, 1958; Putnam, 1993; Greif,
98
1994, Landes, 1998) emphasize the role of social norms and informal institutions that
have a strong and persistent effect on functioning of a government and perceptions of
population. In particular, Weber argued that the Calvinist reformation played a crucial
role in formation of the capitalist system and its institutions. As a result, countries
with high share of Protestants developed institutions best suited for a modern market
economy.
Log GDP per capita (PPP) in constant $2000 is included to control for the
level of economic development. When a country gets richer, it can afford institutions,
which are not economically efficient for poor countries (La Porta et al., 1999; Adsera,
Boix, and Payne, 2003). The causality also goes in the opposite direction: better
governance increases economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995;
Barro, 1999; Hall and Jones, 1999). To deal with a potential bias, several approaches
are implemented: instrumenting GDP per capita by GDP of main trading partners
(AJR, 2005), including lagged GDP per capita, and including GDP per capita in 1992.
Log of population is included to control for a possible efficiency-of-scale effect. The
relationship between quality of governance and log of population is not clear, ex ante.
On the one hand, bigger countries can afford some institutions that are not
economically efficient for small countries which leads to a positive effect; on the
other hand, bigger countries are more difficult to govern due to coordination
problems and more heterogeneous population - hence negative effect could be
present.
More heterogeneous countries have a policy coordination problem due to
conflict of interests between different ethnic and social groups. To control for ethnic
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heterogeneity, an index of language fractionalization is included (Alesina et al.,
2003a). Dummies for legal system origin (English, French, German, Scandinavian,
Soviet: La Porta et al., 1999) are included to control for variation of legal system with
respect to property right protection (e.g., socialist vs. others) and efficiency (common
law vs. civil law). Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin (2006) argue that countries with
abundant natural resources are more likely to have poor governance since they can
afford an inefficient government and protect a status quo in a situation where
resource-poor countries are forced to reform in order to develop non-extracting
industries that require long-term investments, property rights protection, and efficient
institutions. This consideration is empirically supported by Beck and Laeven (2005),
Mehlum, Moene, Torvik (2006) who demonstrated that resource abundant countries
tend to have lower quality of governance. Finally, proportions of Catholics, Muslims,
and Protestants, in 1980, (La Porta et al. 1999) are used as proxies for the cultural
differences across countries to evaluate importance of cultural theory of institutions.
Many studies that look at the relationship between quality of institutions and
economic growth use instrumental variable technique to instrument quality of
governance by its covariates. These studies include AJR (2000) and Easterly and
Levine (1997). Determinants of current institutional arrangements can be traced back
in time. AJR (2000) demonstrated that European colonization had a very deep and
long-lasting impact on institutions in many parts of the world. European colonizers
set rent-extracting type of institutions for populated and labor abundant countries in
South East Asia and South America when a small group of the population
concentrated political and economic power and prevent outsiders from political
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process. At the same time, European colonizers set institutions that allowed a
considerable part of the population to participate in the political process and
institution building in the low populated areas of North America and Australia, which
led to creation of institutions that protected property rights and had a positive impact
on economic growth. As a consequence, "the reversal of fortunes" was observed
when underdeveloped and poor areas of the world were able to surpass in more
developed and populated areas during a relatively short period of time. A direct
approach to control for the effect of colonization on current institutional arrangements
would be inclusion of population densities at the start of colonization and variables
that measure attractiveness of colonized countries for Europeans in terms of climate
and local diseases that had an impact on settlers’ mortality. Unfortunately, the data
requirements to implement this approach would considerably reduce the number of
countries that are investigated in the empirical analysis. Therefore, a different
procedure is implemented. Absolute latitude has been used as a proxy for climate and
settlers mortality. In addition, data on current population and natural resources
capture the impact of factor endowments on institutional development and are highly
correlated across time periods. Therefore, populated, resource abundant countries
remain the same because these factors are largely determined by climate and
geographical location - hence time invariant. As an alternative, country-fixed effects
can be used to control for country-specific historical events that occurred in the past
but have a long lasting effect on institutions.
Panel A of Table 16 presents the summary statistics for the dependent and
explanatory variables. Appendix A gives definitions and data sources for variables
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used in regressions and weighting matrices. Table 16 also provides descriptive
statistics of the dependent variables and their spatial lags by continents in Panel B.
To investigate possible spatial links and spillovers of improvements in
governance, we set up a model that allows for spatial interdependence of quality of
governance, measure spatial autocorrelation, and test statistical significance of the
external influence using spatial econometric tools developed in works pioneered by
Cliff and Ord (1981) and further developed by Anselin (2003), Florax and Vlist
(2003), Kelejian and Prucha (1999, 2004)
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Voice and accountability (VA) 750 -0.06 1.00 -2.32 1.76
Spatial lag of VA 750 -0.09 0.68 -1.02 1.70
Government Effectiveness (GE) 750 0.06 1.05 -2.59 2.59
Spatial lag of GE 750 0.02 0.60 -0.93 2.10
Economic Indicators
Log GDP per capita 708 7.64 1.63 3.89 10.78
Log Population 747 16.14 1.55 12.51 20.98
Legal Origin
English 750 0.28 0.45 0 1
French 750 0.42 0.49 0 1
Socialist 750 0.23 0.42 0 1
German 750 0.04 0.20 0 1
Scandinavian 750 0.03 0.18 0 1
Resources
Log of Explored oil resources 750 -1.60 2.35 -3.00 5.57
Share of raw materials in export 705 0.25 0.29 0.00 0.97
Cultural heterogeneity
Linguistic fractionalization 730 0.39 0.28 0.00 0.92
Religious affiliation
Catholics 750 0.29 0.35 0.00 0.97
Muslims 750 0.25 0.36 0.00 1.00
Protestants 745 0.11 0.21 0.00 0.98
Other 745 0.35 0.33 0.00 1.00
Geography
Landlocked: 1 yes 0 no 750 0.19 0.39 0 1
Absolute latitude 750 0.31 0.19 0 0.72
B. Quality of governance by continent
Africa America Asia Europe Pacific
-0.63 0.24 -0.63 0.86 1.04
(0.72) (0.72) (0.80) (0.75) (0.74)
-0.65 0.18 -0.66 0.84 1.11
(0.12) (0.11) (0.15) (0.17) (0.33)
-0.61 -0.03 -0.09 0.89 1.05
(0.72) (0.84) (0.90) (1.01) (1.30)
-0.64 -0.16 -0.09 0.85 1.18
(0.11) (0.13) (0.18) (0.26) (0.57)
Number of countries 38 27 44 38 3
Spatial lag of GE
Note: Variable definitions and data sources are described in Appendix 1. In panel B, standard deviations are presented in
parentheses
Voice and Accountability
Spatial lag of VA
Government Effectiveness
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Econometric model and estimation
Econometric model of governance with spatial autoregressive lag
Suppose that there are N countries and T periods of observations. The basic
model is represented as
it ij jt k itk it
j k
index w index xρ β ε= + +∑ ∑ (1) 
 
where itindex is the measure of the governance quality in country i in time t. The
spatial lag of the index of governance, ij jt
j
w indexρ∑ , is included to capture the
effect of governance diffusion, i.e., the cumulative impact of the quality of
governance in the neighboring countries j weighted with the corresponding weight
wij. In the base model specification, the weight wij is inversely related to the distance
between countries i and j. The spatial autoregressive parameter ρ , the main parameter
of interest in the paper, measures spatial correlation of quality of governance between
countries i and its neighbors. Spatial correlation is expected to be in the
range 0 1ρ< < , which indicates tendency of neighboring countries to equalize
governance quality due to common factors that shape it. 1 2, ...it it Kitx x x are exogenous
variables that determine quality of governance in country i in period t. itε is an error
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Stacking observations over t, the equation (1) can be written in a more
compact form:
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is a matrix of exogenous variables.
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The intra-cluster variance-covariance matrix Σt is a NxN matrix. Σt can be of
any form and is not explicitly modeled. The clustering can occur because governance
indicators are derived by principle component analysis based on data from more than
a hundred sources. The procedure implies that available government measures are
imprecise and the degree of precision varies from one country to another depending
on the number of sources and a measurement error.
The implication of the model written in the spatial autoregressive form can be
seen if the equation (2) is transformed as follows:
1 1
( )
( ) ( )
I W index X
index I W X I W
ρ β ε
ρ β ρ ε− −
− = +
= − + −
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Under conditions that the weighting matrix W is row normalized and |ρ|<1,37
"Leontef transformation" is applied:
1 2 2( ) ...I W I W Wρ ρ ρ−− = + + +
Therefore
0 0
i i i i
i i





The spatial autoregressive model (1) implies that quality of governance in
country i is determined not only by exogenous variables X and unobservable shocks ε
inside the country but also by spatial exogenous variables WiX and spatial
unobservable shocks Wiε38. Misspecification of the model because of the omitted
spatial lags leads to the biased estimation of coefficients and incorrect inference of
variance-covariance matrix.
Weighting matrix
Currently, there are 193 independent states.39 Many of those states were not
independent less than a century ago. Decolonization, World Wars I and II, breakdown
of the Soviet Union, all those events had a big impact on the political borders which








38 Empirically, the first lag of the exogenous variables and in some instances the first two spatial lags
are used as instruments. This paper uses only the first lag of the exogenous variables as instruments.
Using the second lag of exogenous variables has not changed main results so those results are not
presented in this paper.
39 According to the US Department of States, the term "independent state" refers to a people politically
organized into a sovereign state with a definite territory recognized as independent by the US
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are constantly changing during a time horizon that is long enough. As pointed by
Alesina and Spolaore (2003b), these man-made institutions should be treated as
endogenous when studying long-run determinants of governance. At the same time,
geographical neighbors always interacted with each other regardless of the country
borders through economic, cultural and political links.
The policy diffusion is modeled as a function of the distance between
countries. The weighting matrix for the base model specification is defined as
follows: a weight between countries i and j, wij, is equal to the inverse of the distance,
where distance, dij, is a weighted distance
40 between the biggest cities in two
countries, if they are located on the same continent. If countries i and j are located on
the different continents then dij is set equal to infinity.
41 Diagonal elements of this





























40 The distance between any two biggest cities are weighted by the shares of those cities in the total population and than the
average distance is calculated.
41 The list of continents includes: Africa, America, Asia, Europe, and Pacific.
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Each row of *W is scaled by the coefficient in order to row-
normalize it, i.e., the elements of each row sum to one. The weighting matrix for the




























Another weighting matrix specification that looks at the relative geographical
position of the countries and is widely used in spatial modeling defines neighbors as
countries that have common borders. These weights are complementary to the
distance based weighting specification and can be used to check the sensitivity of
results to the choice of weighting matrix. The weight is set equal to 1 if countries i
and j have a common border and 0 otherwise. The matrix of weights is row-
normalized.
Cultural, economic, and political links can also be strong between countries
that share the same language and history but are not geographically close. Countries
that share a common language have strong cultural ties and common history British
Empire had colonies in the remotest parts of the World. Spanish colonies in South
America were thousands of miles away from Madrid. Under alternative weighting
specifications, countries are considered as neighbors when they share common
















cultural neighbors. Similarly, Metropolises and their former colonies are defined as
political neighbors.42 Again, matrices of weights are row-normalized.
Test for spatial correlation and heteroskedasticity of errors
First, consider a typical model that does not include a spatial lag of dependent
variable and have homoskedastic errors:
0 :H index X β ε= +
where ε is
2~ (0, )iid N σ . Here, X includes all covariates of governance mentioned
in the literature. The model is tested for misspecification due to the omitted
autoregressive lag and an alternative model is suggested:
1 :H index Windex Xρ β ε= + +
Anselin (1988) suggested a Lagrange Multiplier test for an omitted spatial lag which
has the following form:





42 Data on former colonies and colonizers is taken from CEPEII database. Colonizers of the country for
a relatively long period of time and with a substantial participation in the governance of the colonized
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. Under the null hypothesis,
2~ (1)LM ρ χ .
Secondly, a standard instrumental variable estimation assumes homoskedastic
standard errors and produces incorrect estimation of the variance covariance matrix if
errors are heteroskedastic and clustered at the country level. Therefore, it is important
to check for heteroskedasticity of errors using Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test
(see Breusch and Pagan, 1979; Cook and Weisberg, 1983). The null hypothesis is the
constant variance of error term.
Consistent estimation of spatial autoregressive parameter ρ
If the test for no spatial autocorrelation and homoskedasticity fails, the model
with the following functional form is estimated:
index Windex Xρ β ε= + + (2)




























The spatial lag of the quality of governance is an endogenous variable and
cannot be estimated by simple OLS regression as was demonstrated in the previous
section. However, the model (2) can be estimated by the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) that uses spatial lags of exogenous variables as instruments. From
the equation (3), it follows that
( | ) ...E index X X WXβ ρ β= + +
and
( ) 0, 0,1, 2...iE W X iε = =  
The model (1) is estimated and tested for validity and relevancy of
instruments as described in Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2002). The spatial lag of
the quality of governance is instrumented by the spatial lag of all exogenous
explanatory variables that are present in the equation. Validity of the instruments is
checked by testing orthogonality between the excluded first stage instruments and
errors in the estimated equation. The test for overidentifying restrictions was
suggested by Hansen (1982). Suppose that the model has L moment conditions and K
regressors. The system of equations is overidentified when L>K which is the case in
the model presented in this paper. The Hansen’s J statistics, which is asymptotically
distributed as )(
2 KL −χ under the null hypothesis of orthogonality between
instruments and errors, indicates whether suggested instruments are valid.
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The suggested instruments should also be relevant and explain the
instrumented variable reasonably well. F statistics that test if all excluded instruments
are not significant in the first stage regression is reported in the next section.
Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that the instruments are relevant.
Results
Indices of governance and geography
A world distribution of governance measured by KKZ indices is non-random and
geographically clustered. The distribution of governance indicators in 2004 is
presented with the series of maps for voice and accountability (VA) and government
effectiveness (GE), in Figure 10.43 All countries are divided into four quartiles
according to their ranking for a particular indicator of governance. Countries located
in the top quartile (better governance) of an index distribution are shown in lighter
grey color, in the second quartile in light grey, in the third quartile in dark grey, and
in the last quartile in darker grey color. In addition, countries located in the top and
bottom deciles are shown in white and black colors consequently. Based on this
figures, two patterns can be observed. First, countries that have a high score in one
cluster of governance tend to have high scores in other clusters. Second, countries
with better governance are located further away from the equator with the majority
located in Europe and North America while countries that are poorly governed are
primarily located closer to the equator in Africa, Middle East and Central Asia.
43 Maps generated by the interactive tool provided by the World Bank It is available at
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2004/worldmap.asp#map
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Figure 10 Governance indicators
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In order to check whether the visual observations can be supported
statistically, a presence of spatial autocorrelation of government indicators is tested.
For any model specification discussed in the next section, an OLS regression that
does not include a spatial lag of the dependent variable is evaluated and the Lagrange
Multiplier test for a spatial autocorrelation of dependent variable is reported. The
LM ρ statistics indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% confidence interval for
all model specifications that do not include the spatial lag of the dependent variable.
Spatial autocorrelation of governance: IV regressions
A. Voice and accountability
Table 17 presents empirical evidences of the spatial autocorrelation of the
voice and accountability index of governance. Columns (1)-(11) show results of panel
regressions estimated by GMM procedure with the spatial lags of exogenous
variables as instruments for the spatial lag of the dependent variable. Column (1) has
results of two regressions with and without the spatial autoregressive lag, in the base
model specification. First, the base model without the spatial lag is estimated and the
spatial autocorrelation using the Lagrange Multiplier test is checked. The null
hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation of voice and accountability is strongly
rejected as shown in the table. Second, the spatial lag of voice and accountability is
included and the regression is estimated again. The coefficient of the spatial lag of
index of governance, 0.232, is highly significant which implies that, for an average
African country, relocation to the European continent would increase voice and
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accountability by 56%.44 If countries are ranked according to their index of voice and
accountability, it means an upward movement in the ranking by 25 positions. Log of
GDP per capita can cause biased estimates of coefficients due to reverse causality
between the quality of governance and income. Column (2) presents results without
log of GDP per capita as an explanatory variable. Alternative proxies for economic
development are presented in columns (3)-(5). A lagged log of GDP per capita in
column (3), log of GDP per capita in 1992 in the column (4), and the log of GDP per
capita instrumented by the log of GDP per capita of the trading partners (AJR 2005)
in column (5) are included to investigate the influence of potential biases on the
estimated coefficients. The coefficient of spatial autocorrelation remains highly
significant and stays in a range 0.232-0.348. Overall, the level of economic
development has a positive impact on the index of voice and accountability. It is
positive and significant in all model specifications. A country size measured by log of
population has no impact on voice and accountability in all regressions at 5%
significance level.
44 Average index of spatial lag of voice and accountability is -0.65 in Africa and 0.84 in Europe. Other
things being equal, relocation would increase index of voice and accountability from -0.63 to -0.28.
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Table 17 Spatial lag of voice and accountability
1a 1b 2 3 4 5 6
No GDP Lag GDP Init GDP IV GDP Raw Mat
Spatial lag of:
Voice and accountability 0.232** 0.394*** 0.307*** 0.348*** 0.247** 0.248***
(2.454) (3.898) (3.106) (3.440) (2.239) (3.194)
Log GDP per capita 0.271*** 0.254*** 0.243*** 0.214***
(12.111) (5.654) (2.697) (5.897)
Lag of log GDP per capita 0.291***
(4.978)
Log GDP per capita in 1992 0.273***
(4.245)
Log Population 0.014 0.016 -0.077*** 0.001 0.001 0.014 -0.031
(0.917) (0.587) (2.981) (0.029) (0.032) (0.370) (1.257)
Absolute Lattitude 1.423*** 1.053*** 2.348*** 1.207*** 1.235*** 1.079** 0.979***
(7.879) (3.088) (7.679) (3.463) (3.362) (2.275) (3.344)
Landlocked (1=yes 0=no) 0.179*** 0.205** 0.129 0.134 0.12 0.202* 0.206*
(3.368) (2.000) (1.002) (1.203) (1.054) (1.849) (1.940)
Log of oil reserves, mln barrels -0.093*** -0.070*** -0.01 -0.060*** -0.057*** -0.068***
(8.886) (3.792) (0.604) (3.487) (3.086) (2.726)
Share of raw materials in export -0.604***
(4.091)
Linguistic fractionalization -0.224*** -0.131 -0.295* -0.143 -0.163 -0.147 0.063
(2.793) (0.947) (1.821) (0.978) (1.090) (0.993) (0.458)
Religion
catho80 0.055 -0.085 -0.139 -0.115 -0.169 -0.102 -0.076
(0.671) (0.539) (0.760) (0.713) (1.023) (0.643) (0.496)
muslim80 -0.855*** -0.800*** -0.993*** -0.736*** -0.771*** -0.808*** -0.739***
(10.307) (4.819) (6.017) (4.275) (4.420) (4.842) (4.375)
protestants80 0.532*** 0.506** 0.237 0.507** 0.436* 0.507** 0.505***
(3.532) (2.535) (0.906) (2.271) (1.793) (2.353) (2.675)
Legal Origin (baseline is British)
French -0.079 -0.05 -0.104 -0.055 -0.056 -0.048 0.061
(1.427) (0.537) (1.024) (0.565) (0.564) (0.508) (0.666)
Socialist -0.579*** -0.524*** -1.133*** -0.636*** -0.678*** -0.545*** -0.392***
(7.066) (3.737) (8.257) (4.467) (4.619) (2.608) (2.806)
German -0.326*** -0.207* 0.173 -0.14 -0.141 -0.195 0.026
(3.010) (1.649) (0.959) (1.082) (1.042) (1.027) (0.241)
Scandinavian -0.467*** -0.473*** -0.603*** -0.509*** -0.517*** -0.489*** -0.328**
(2.980) (3.058) (2.776) (3.072) (3.002) (3.007) (2.397)
Constant -2.517*** -2.292*** 1.162*** -2.534*** -2.312*** -2.156* -1.094**
(6.755) (3.429) (2.585) (3.349) (2.771) (1.781) (2.079)
Observations 708 708 747 686 690 708 678
Adjusted R squared 0.742 0.749 0.693 0.737 0.729 0.749 0.753
LM test for spatial autocorellation
(spatial lag is not included in regression) 49.05*** 27.33*** 29.22*** 29.62*** 32.56***
Relevancy of instruments
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic 1853.27 1824.90 1788.13 1853.76 210.98 1803.01
Validity of instruments
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of
all instruments) 12.13 13.57 11.42 12.76 11.82 9.50
Chi-sq P-val = 0.44 0.26 0.50 0.39 0.38 0.66
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Base Model
Notes: Estimated by generalized method of moments with spatial lags of exogenous variables as instruments for the spatial lag of voice
and accountability. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity- and cluster-robust. t-statistics presented in parentheses
29.62***
Dependent variable is index of voice and accountability
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7 8 9 10 11
Culture Legal Colony Colony&Legal FD
Spatial lag of:
Voice and accountability 0.210** 0.527*** 0.182* 0.242** 0.781***
(2.094) (5.621) (1.737) (2.306) (3.561)
Log GDP per capita 0.337*** 0.295*** 0.276*** 0.222*** 0.13
(9.563) (5.778) (8.407) (5.737) (0.719)
Log Population 0.049* 0.042 0.023 0.002 -0.003
(1.728) (1.379) (0.872) (0.100) (0.197)
Absolute Lattitude 0.223 0.09 0.938*** 1.292***
(0.750) (0.243) (3.055) (4.140)
Landlocked (1=yes 0=no) 0.126 0.182* 0.063 0.1
(1.208) (1.647) (0.644) (1.022)
Log of oil reserves, mln barrels -0.099*** -0.095*** -0.088*** -0.067***
(5.997) (4.588) (6.117) (3.942)
Linguistic fractionalization 0.03 -0.068 0.023 -0.131
(0.212) (0.446) (0.160) (0.900)
Religion
catho80 0.038 0.144 -0.078
(0.240) (0.905) (0.465)
muslim80 -0.617*** -0.639*** -0.796***
(3.870) (4.272) (4.649)
protestants80 0.510*** 0.560*** 0.559***
(2.803) (3.178) (2.595)


















Never colony -0.246** -0.253**
(2.424) (2.108)
Country dummies
Constant -3.544*** -2.854*** -2.678*** -1.850***
(6.260) (3.942) (5.297) (3.331)
Observations 708 708 708 708 565
Adjusted R squared 0.73 0.70 0.74 0.75 0.03
LM test for spatial autocorellation (spatial lag
is not included in regression) 25.39*** 169.07*** 23.93*** 30.23***
Relevancy of instruments
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic 1787.40 1795.23 1843.11 1961.51 173.40
Validity of instruments
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all
instruments) 8.50 18.25 10.64 17.30 0.67
Chi-sq P-val = 0.39 0.03 0.64 0.43 0.41
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Estimated by generalized method of moments with spatial lags of exogenous variables as instruments for the spatial lag of
voice and accountability. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity- and cluster-robust. t-statistics presented in parentheses
Dependent variable is index of voice and accountability
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Due to omitted spatial lag in column (1a), the coefficient of the linguistic
fractionalization, -0.224, indicates significant and negative impact on the quality of
governance. The result, however, does not hold when the spatial lag of voice and
accountability is included in column (1b). Similar effect is observed for the German
legal origin indicator. It increases from -0.326 to -0.207 and loses significance. These
evidences demonstrate importance of inclusion of the spatial dimension in cross-
country regressions for correct estimation of regression coefficients.
Even after accounting for the spatial autocorrelation, geographic factors play
an important role in determining quality of governance. A coefficient of the absolute
latitude, which proxies for the effects of the absolute geographical location, is
positive and significant. Nonetheless, it decreases from 1.42 in column (1a) to 1.05 in
column (1b) that indicates importance of both absolute and relative geographical
locations. Somewhat surprisingly, the base regression indicates that landlocked
countries have better governance. It is likely that this phenomenon can be attributed
to the fact that the population of landlocked countries have lower costs of relocation,
while population of island-states, due to natural barriers, have higher costs of
relocation and can be easily prevented from emigrating.
There is strong evidence in favor of the theory that abundance of natural
resources reduces incentives of the government to react for the demand for higher
accountability and more competitive political environment. Government can grant a
permission to extract natural resources to several companies or even introduce a state
controlled monopoly45. The government can further introduce high taxes on natural
resource extracting businesses and high export duties in those sectors. As a result,
45 For example, Gazprom in Russia is a private company controlled by the government.
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government can effectively collect revenues without effective government policies in
other sectors of the economy and without socially oriented reforms. Results hold
when the measure of the natural resource potential is replaced by the actual share of
the export of raw materials as presented in the column (6). However, these results
should be interpreted with care due to potential endogeneity of this measure:
industrial groups oriented to export raw materials can lobby for preferential treatment
from the government and distort political processes to their own benefit.
Cultural differences measured by variations in composition of religious
groups have an important impact on the quality of governance even when controlling
for the spatial autocorrelation. Countries with high share of Muslims have lower
quality of governance with the coefficient -0.8 in column (1b) while countries with
high proportion of Protestants have better quality of voice and accountability with the
coefficient 0.5. Proportion of Catholics, on the other hand, does not have a significant
impact on the voice and accountability. These findings support the idea that cultural
differences and traditions, shaped by religious beliefs, put constraints on the form of
government and its performance (Weber, 1958; Landes, 1998). La Porta (1999)
indicated that legal system origin and composition of religion groups are highly
correlated with each other. For example, countries colonized by France inherited a
French legal system and had a higher share of Catholics; while countries colonized by
England inherited a English legal system, and had a higher share of Protestants. A
regression that excludes country legal origin dummies was performed to see whether
it has any effect on the coefficients of cultural variables in column (7).
120
Socialist origin of the legal system have a significant and negative coefficient,
-0.524, in the base model specification and is robust in all model specifications. This
result, however, should have an interpretation that goes beyond the legal system
origin argument. Socialist legal origin dummy can be considered as a proxy for the
Socialist system of government in general, which has a long-lasting adverse effect on
the formation of democratic institutions of governance. In addition, Socialist
countries experienced a period of transition that influenced quality of governance.
Somewhat surprisingly, Scandinavian legal origin has a negative impact on voice and
accountability. The result does not hold, however, if the share of Protestants is
excluded from the regression due to high correlation between those two variables as
demonstrated in column (8). Models in columns (9) and (10) investigate how colonial
legacy, in addition to the legal system origin, influence voice and accountability. The
baseline for these dummies is English former colony.
Finally, the results of regressions in the first differences are presented in
columns (11). These allow us to remove country fixed effects and look at short-term
fluctuations of governance and its determinants. The coefficient of the lag of voice
and accountability remains highly significant. More importantly, it is higher than in
regressions (1)-(10).
The test for spatial autocorrelation, presented below the adjusted R-squared is
significant at 1% level for all model specifications. Tables also report diagnostic
statistics of the first stage IV regressions to assess relevancy and validity of used
instruments. Instruments are highly relevant in all models that is indicated by the high
value of the LR statistics. An overidentification test presented below the LR statistics
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demonstrates that instruments pass the test for orthogonality of instruments for all
models except in the column (8) when cultural proxies are excluded from the
regression.
Channels of the policy diffusion
This section discusses the sensitivity of results to the choice of weights and
existence of alternative spatial links based on common language or common history
that are not related to distance measures. Table 18 presents results in the base model
specification for four different weighting matrices. Column (1) presents results with
the weights inversely related to distance, which is the same regression as in column
(1b) of Table 17. It is included as a reference point. In column (2), preliminary
weights are set equal to 1 if countries i and j share a common border and 0 otherwise
and scaled to add up to one in each row. An estimated spatial autoregressive
parameter remains positive and significant and change value from 0.232 to 0.204. In
this case, choice of the weighting matrix does not change signs and significance
levels of the coefficients of independent variables with the exception of
ethnolinguistic fractionalization. It also has little impact on quantitative values of
estimated coefficients. In column (3), spatial neighbors are defined as countries that
share a common language. The dummy variable that defines the common language is
taken from the CEPII’s geographical and distance measures dataset. As can be seen in
column (3), a spatial autocorrelation of voice and accountability between countries
that share common language is not significantly different from zero. Finally, in
column (4), a hypothesis of a spatial autocorrelation of quality of governance between
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countries that share common history during the colonization period is tested. The
results show no evidence of policy diffusion through this channel.
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Table 18 Spatial lag of voice and accountability: alternative weights
Different weighting matrices
1 2 3 4




Voice and accountability 0.232** 0.204*** 0.011 0.048
(2.454) (2.647) (0.173) (0.867)
Log GDP per capita 0.254*** 0.237*** 0.254*** 0.262***
(5.654) (5.393) (5.685) (6.212)
Log Population 0.016 0 0.012 0.024
(0.587) (0.003) (0.414) (0.838)
Absolute Lattitude 1.053*** 1.086*** 1.513*** 1.551***
(3.088) (3.342) (4.607) (4.550)
Landlocked (1=yes 0=no) 0.205** 0.181** 0.099 0.157
(2.000) (1.963) (0.928) (1.522)
Log of oil reserves, mln thds barrels -0.070*** -0.089*** -0.085*** -0.098***
(3.792) (4.967) (4.574) (5.669)
Linguistic fractionalization -0.131 -0.290** -0.255* -0.192
(0.947) (2.084) (1.693) (1.320)
Religion
catho80 -0.085 -0.114 0.093 0.054
(0.539) (0.783) (0.678) (0.399)
muslim80 -0.800*** -0.763*** -0.841*** -0.742***
(4.819) (4.730) (5.394) (4.802)
protestants80 0.506** 0.493*** 0.505*** 0.572***
(2.535) (2.653) (2.582) (3.083)
Legal Origin:
french -0.05 -0.052 -0.118 0.009
(0.537) (0.533) (1.206) (0.088)
socialist -0.524*** -0.508*** -0.549*** -0.515***
(3.737) (3.713) (3.901) (3.489)
german -0.207* -0.231* -0.301** -0.245**
(1.649) (1.858) (2.210) (2.164)
scandinavian -0.473*** -0.485*** -0.471*** -0.451***
(3.058) (3.289) (2.822) (2.924)
Constant -2.292*** -1.847** -2.332*** -2.768***
(3.429) (2.530) (3.360) (4.105)
Observations 708 708 708 708
R squared 0.749 0.752 0.74 0.74
Relevancy
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic 1853.27 558.70 1184.11 1590.98
Validity
Hansen J statistic (overidentification
test of all instruments) 12.13 7.12 9.96 12.34
Chi-sq P-val = 0.44 0.85 0.53 0.42
Standard errors below the coefficients
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes:We report results in the base model specification for different weighting matrices. In column (2), weights are set equal to 1 if
countries have a common border and 0 otherwise. In column (3), weights are set equal to 1 if countries share the same language and 0
otherwise. In column (4), weights are set equal to 1 if one of the countries was a colony of the other one and 0 otherwise. All weights are
raw-normalized, t-statistics presented in parentheses.
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B. Government effectiveness
There is a high correlation between measures of voice and accountability and
government effectiveness that is equal to 0.79 for the whole sample. Nevertheless,
some distinct geographical patterns of distribution of the government effectiveness
index across continents are observed that are not identical to the spatial distribution of
the index of voice and accountability. For example, countries located in American
continent score higher than Asian countries in terms of voice and accountability: 0.24
in America and -0.63 in Asia. At the same time, they have about the same averages of
government effectiveness: -0.03 in America and -0.09 in Asia. Theoretically, other
things being equal, countries that have more competitive selection of government
should also have more effective governments. On the other hand, countries differ in
terms of their size, population diversity, and structure of political system. This
diversity can create coordination problems and redistribution conflicts that can be
relatively easily solved by an authoritarian ruler and very difficult to solve by a
democratic society. Therefore, investigation of determinants of government
effectiveness gives additional insights on the spatial diffusion of governance.
We run regressions similar to the ones discussed in the previous chapter with
the dependent variable of index of government effectiveness. However, a different
weighting matrix that defines neighbors as countries having a common border is used
in all models discussed in this section because regressions using weights inversely
related to distance do not pass the Hansen J test. Robustness of results with
alternative weighting specifications is presented and discussed in the next section.
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Columns (1a) and (1b) in Table 19 present results of the base model
specification with and without the spatial lag of government effectiveness. The
hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation in column (1a) is strongly rejected as
indicated by a high value of Anselin’s Lagrange Multiplier statistic, 39.83. The
estimated coefficient of the spatial autoregressive parameter in column (1b) is 0.254.
The result is robust the use of alternative measures of GDP per capita in columns (3)
and (4) and is significant at 6% level if log of GDP per capita is instrumented by the
weighted log of GDP of the main trading partners as shown in column (5). The spatial
autoregressive lag decreases substantially and loses its significance when legal origin
dummies are not included as explanatory variables in the column (7). It is not
surprising, since the legal system is a very important government institution which
determines how efficient the government is. When dummies of legal origin are
excluded, it is also implicitly assumed that there is no policy diffusion mechanism
that works through the legal system channels. At the same time, the coefficient of the
spatial lag of government effectiveness is positive and significant in column (8)
where cultural proxies are excluded. Therefore, it can be concluded that cultural
channels of policy diffusion are weaker determinants of government effectiveness
than legal channels are. Similarly to the analysis of voice and accountability, the
coefficient of spatial autocorrelation is substantially higher when we run a regression
in the first differences in column (11).
When the results of the models in columns (1a) and (1b) are compared,
coefficients of absolute latitude, linguistic fractionalization, share of Muslims, and
French legal origin lose their significance after a spatial lag is included. Rich and
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populated countries tend to have more efficient governments as indicated by positive
and significant coefficients of log of GDP per capita and log of population. The
coefficient of log of GDP per capita in (1b), 0.468, is almost twice as big as the same
coefficient in the regression with voice and accountability discussed in the previous
section. The log of population has a positive and significant coefficient, 0.099, in the
base model specification but the result is not robust in some of the alternative
specifications. It is also important to mention that causality can also go in the
opposite direction: more efficiently governed states are bigger and more prosperous.
Three factors that are important and robust in virtually all model
specifications include: abundance of natural resources, share of Catholics, and
Socialist legal origin. A negative sign of log of oil reserves supports the theory that
abundance of natural resources has an adverse effect on the efficiency of state
bureaucrats. When an alternative proxy in column (6) is used - a share of raw
materials in total export - the effect is even stronger. Countries with high proportion
of Catholics have less efficient governments. Finally, the Socialist legal origin has a
negative impact on the government effectiveness. As in the previous section, it is
likely that the Soviet legal system origin dummy proxies not only for a distinct
structure of Soviet legal system but also for the whole system of Socialist institutions.
It also captures an effect of transition period on governance that was experienced by
former Socialist countries
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Table 19 Spatial lag of government effectiveness
1a 1b 2 3 4 5 6
No GDP Lag GDP Init GDP IV GDP Raw Mat
Spatial lag of:
Government effectiveness 0.254*** 0.472*** 0.309*** 0.369*** 0.210* 0.216***
(3.439) (4.587) (4.508) (4.942) (1.894) (3.247)
Log GDP per capita 0.562*** 0.468*** 0.523*** 0.397***
(26.568) (10.334) (4.650) (10.024)
Lag of log GDP per capita 0.538***
(10.591)
Log GDP per capita in 1992 0.491***
(8.568)
Log Population 0.099*** 0.080*** -0.086*** 0.02 0.015 0.096** 0.015
(6.771) (3.065) (3.069) (0.836) (0.575) (2.353) (0.812)
Absolute Lattitude 0.505*** 0.37 2.395*** 0.653* 0.707* 0.197 0.475
(2.959) (1.084) (5.744) (1.809) (1.829) (0.438) (1.575)
Landlocked (1=yes 0=no) 0.222*** 0.182** -0.119 0.122 0.085 0.216* 0.127
(4.410) (2.010) (0.947) (1.139) (0.739) (1.948) (1.480)
Log of oil reserves, mln barrels -0.107*** -0.096*** 0.01 -0.068*** -0.065*** -0.109***
(10.802) (5.916) (0.469) (4.351) (3.787) (3.842)
Share of raw materials in export -0.784***
(6.479)
Linguistic fractionalization 0.170** 0.152 -0.18 -0.016 -0.105 0.197 0.293**
(2.240) (1.202) (0.965) (0.127) (0.787) (1.244) (2.447)
Religion
catho80 -0.340*** -0.358*** -0.102 -0.340** -0.375** -0.371*** -0.215*
(4.386) (2.741) (0.542) (2.345) (2.381) (2.800) (1.646)
muslim80 -0.190** -0.118 -0.366* -0.122 -0.174 -0.09 0.034
(2.424) (0.851) (1.926) (0.837) (1.141) (0.583) (0.245)
protestants80 0.141 0.202 -0.179 0.199 0.129 0.243 0.464**
(0.992) (0.877) (0.553) (0.764) (0.447) (0.976) (2.406)
Legal Origin (baseline is British)
French -0.141*** -0.097 -0.263** -0.107 -0.121 -0.094 -0.036
(2.693) (1.112) (2.010) (1.169) (1.259) (1.022) (0.440)
Socialist -0.406*** -0.342** -1.142*** -0.578*** -0.633*** -0.284 -0.271**
(5.232) (2.501) (6.062) (3.858) (3.932) (1.537) (2.184)
German -0.433*** -0.297* 0.550*** -0.1 -0.066 -0.406 0.043
(4.233) (1.810) (3.051) (0.615) (0.391) (1.631) (0.351)
Scandinavian 0.026 0.03 -0.069 -0.052 -0.069 0.028 0.004
(0.174) (0.134) (0.232) (0.210) (0.249) (0.122) (0.023)
Constant -5.950*** -4.909*** 1.327*** -4.812*** -4.241*** -5.598*** -3.199***
(16.878) (7.459) (2.740) (7.145) (5.675) (3.733) (6.392)
Observations 708 708 747 686 690 708 678
Adjusted R squared 0.8 0.811 0.646 0.788 0.763 0.812 0.807
LM test for spatial autocorellation
(spatial lag is not included in regression) 106.22*** 52.70*** 58.93*** 39.83*** 34.80***
Relevancy of instruments
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic 531.84 468.96 485.58 455.06 94.84 494.22
Validity of instruments
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of
all instruments) 14.81 18.00 15.77 14.53 15.19 14.32
Chi-sq P-val = 0.25 0.08 0.20 0.27 0.17 0.28
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Base Model
Notes: Estimated by generalized method of moments with spatial lags of exogenous variables as instruments for the spatial lag of voice
and accountability. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity- and cluster-robust. t-statistics presented in parentheses
39.83***
Dependent variable is index of government effectiveness
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7 8 9 10 11
Culture Legal Colony Colony&Legal FD
Spatial lag of:
Government Effectiveness 0.179* 0.205*** 0.345*** 0.257*** 0.652**
(1.658) (2.834) (4.100) (3.700) (2.163)
Log GDP per capita 0.521*** 0.462*** 0.453*** 0.448*** 0.376***
(11.430) (9.739) (12.175) (10.577) (3.711)
Log Population 0.092*** 0.067** 0.079*** 0.085*** -0.364
(3.493) (2.526) (3.669) (3.829) (1.620)
Absolute Lattitude -0.04 0.488 0.311 0.656*
(0.161) (1.451) (1.041) (1.933)
Landlocked (1=yes 0=no) 0.150* 0.157* 0.151* 0.209**
(1.688) (1.687) (1.782) (2.389)
Log of oil reserves, mln barrels -0.098*** -0.092*** -0.083*** -0.083***
(5.836) (5.943) (5.844) (5.409)
Linguistic fractionalization 0.21 0.254** 0.201 0.211
(1.593) (1.992) (1.631) (1.636)
Religion
catho80 -0.310** -0.301** -0.290**
(2.451) (2.372) (2.232)
muslim80 -0.016 -0.102 -0.162
(0.120) (0.815) (1.200)
protestants80 0.447*** 0.328** 0.16
(2.816) (2.055) (0.709)


















Never colony -0.278** -0.298***
(2.476) (2.925)
Constant -5.608*** -4.777*** -4.724*** -4.829***
(8.355) (7.109) (9.023) (8.477)
Observations 708 708 565
Adjusted R squared 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.82
LM test for spatial autocorellation (spatial lag
is not included in regression) 48.79*** 26.10*** 38.43*** 36.11***
Relevancy of instruments
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic 293.99 408.51 502.50 581.40 14.26
Validity of instruments
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all
instruments) 11.65 14.28 16.63 20.94 1.14
Chi-sq P-val = 0.17 0.11 0.22 0.23 0.28
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Estimated by generalized method of moments with spatial lags of exogenous variables as instruments for the spatial lag of
voice and accountability. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity- and cluster-robust. t-statistics presented in parentheses
Dependent variable is index of government effectiveness
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Channels of the policy diffusion
The previous section discussed results with only contiguous countries defined
as neighbors. There are no significant differences in results when distance based
weights are used as shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 20. An interesting result
that distinguishes these regressions from results of the previous section is a positive
and significant coefficient of the spatial autoregressive parameter in column (4)
where neighbors are defined as a pair of countries one of which previously was a
colony of the other.
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Table 20 Spatial lag of governance effectiveness: alternative weights
Different weighting matrices
1 2 3 4




Government Effectiveness 0.244** 0.254*** 0.073 0.086**
{2.403} {3.439} {0.786} {2.027}
Log GDP per capita 0.525*** 0.468*** 0.552*** 0.532***
{10.589} {10.334} {11.969} {11.073}
Log Population 0.092*** 0.080*** 0.095*** 0.090***
{3.472} {3.065} {3.816} {3.521}
Absolute Lattitude 0.454 0.37 0.56 1.017**
{1.136} {1.084} {1.480} {2.433}
Landlocked (1=yes 0=no) 0.299*** 0.182** 0.213** 0.214**
{3.353} {2.010} {2.277} {2.434}
Log of oil reserves, mln thds barrels -0.108*** -0.096*** -0.115*** -0.106***
{5.750} {5.916} {6.645} {5.823}
Linguistic fractionalization 0.242* 0.152 0.21 0.121
{1.776} {1.202} {1.581} {0.874}
Religion
catho80 -0.320** -0.358*** -0.219 -0.361**
{2.240} {2.741} {1.643} {2.510}
muslim80 -0.15 -0.118 -0.02 -0.122
{0.990} {0.851} {0.139} {0.821}
protestants80 0.211 0.202 0.126 0.109
{0.891} {0.877} {0.509} {0.474}
Legal Origin:
french -0.109 -0.097 -0.11 -0.031
{1.148} {1.112} {1.182} {0.340}
socialist -0.518*** -0.342** -0.365** -0.444***
{3.583} {2.501} {2.538} {3.256}
german -0.429** -0.297* -0.408** -0.245
{2.374} {1.810} {1.970} {1.215}
scandinavian -0.128 0.03 0.165 -0.052
{0.590} {0.134} {0.681} {0.221}
Constant -5.612*** -4.909*** -5.967*** -5.847***
{8.107} {7.459} {9.517} {9.245}
Observations 708 708 708 708
R squared 0.798 0.811 0.799 0.8
Relevancy
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic
Validity 1674.77 531.84 1366.30 1285.82
Hansen J statistic (overidentification
test of all instruments)
Chi-sq P-val = 26.07 14.81 19.63 20.72
Standard errors below the coefficients 0.01 0.25 0.05 0.05
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes:We report results in the base model specification for different weighting matrices. In column (2), weights are set equal to 1 if
countries have a common border and 0 otherwise. In column (3), weights are set equal to 1 if countries share the same language and 0
otherwise. In column (4), weights are set equal to 1 if one of the countries was a colony of the other one and 0 otherwise. All weights are
raw-normalized, t-statistics presented in parentheses.
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Conclusions
Political and economic institutions inside a country are determined not only
by internal, country-specific factors but also by broader regional factors, especially in
neighboring countries. Formation of institutions of governance is a long process
which is shaped by economic, cultural, and political factors that interact within a
country and between different countries. In the long run, country borders are
endogenously determined because of political and economic competition among
country states. During the process, successful, economically and politically viable
countries succeed in expanding their borders and spheres of economic and cultural
influence while unsuccessful, non-efficient governments contract and lose ground on
the international arena.
Because of this interconnectedness, economic and political studies of
development should take into account spatial links between countries. The policy
diffusion effect is robust and quite substantial on its own. More importantly, failure to
include spatial autoregressive lag leads to biased estimates of the coefficients in
regressions that study determinants of governance and impact of governance on
economic development. In this paper, the negative effect of ethnolingustic
fractionalization on voice and accountability disappears when the spatial lag is
included. The negative impact of French legal system on voice and accountability and
negative impact of French or German legal system on government effectiveness
becomes not significant when the spatial autocorrelation is included in the
regressions. At the same time, the effect of the socialist legal origin on quality of
governance remains negative and robust. Results for the cultural determinants of
132
quality of governance remain robust and agree with the previous studies. Economic
factors and abundance of natural resources have significant impact on the quality of
governance and work in opposite directions: economically rich countries have better
governments but natural resource rich countries have worse governance due to lower
incentives to reform.
It is important to point out that we have found a useful instrumental variable
to investigate the impact of institutions on economic growth and development: spatial
lags of economic, cultural, and political variables are correlated with institutions
inside the country and are less likely to correlate with errors as demonstrated by IV
regressions in tables 16-20.
From the policy perspectives, an important lesson can be drawn: it is very
unlikely to build a democratic and efficient government in a separate country that is
surrounded by authoritarian governed countries. It is equally unlikely that a
dictatorship will last in a predominantly democratic region. Therefore, development
policies should focus on regional development in poor regions with bad governance
rather than on separate countries.
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Appendices
A. Estimation of the model parameters46
Stacking observations in (1) over i=1,2,…,N yields
ttttt uzindexWindexFDI +++= γδβln (2)
where
)'ln...,ln(lnln ,2,1 Ntttt FDIFDIFDIFDI =












































)'...,( ,2,1 Ntttt uuuu =
Note that lnFDIt, indext, and ut are Nx1 vectors which relate to, respectively,
the dependent variable, the index of governance, and the disturbance term over the N
countries at time t. W1 is an NxN time invariant weighting matrix, and zt is an NxK
matrix of observations of K exogenous variables.
46 We use a modified version of the program available at
http://www.econ.umd.edu/~prucha/Research_Prog3.htm.
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In the next step, the spatial error structure is specified. Because of
unobservable regional shocks, errors are expected to be spatial correlated47.
Therefore, the following error structure is assumed:
ttt uWu ερ += , |ρ|<1 
where ρ is a scalar autoregressive parameter and
)'...,( ,2,1 Ntttt εεεε =
is N×1 vector of innovations in period t.
These innovations consist of a country specific error component and an error
component that varies across countries and time periods. The specification is
consistent with a classical one way error component model. Specifically, the i-th
element of tε has the following form:
itiit νµε +=
where iµ is i.i.d. ),0(
2
µσ , itν is i.i.d. over both i and t with ),0(
2
νσ and the processes
}{ iµ and }{ itν are independent.
Stacking the observations over t=1,2,…,T yields
uZindexWIindexFDI T ++⊗+= γδβ *)(*ln (2)
with
)'ln,...,ln,(lnln 21 TFDIFDIFDIFDI =
is an NTx1 vector of observations on the dependent variable.
47 For example, Russian financial crisis in August 1998 had a spillover effect on financial systems of
all transition countries. Introduction of protective trade barriers or quotas is another example of a shock
that can spread over the region.
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)',...,,( 21 Tindexindexindexindex =
is an NTx1 vector of index of governance.
)'',...,','( 21 TZZZZ =
is an NTxK matrix of exogenous variables that influence lnFDI. Also
ερ +⊗= uWIu T )(
νµε +⊗= )( NT Ie
where
)',...,,( 21 Nµµµµ =
is an N×1 vector of unit specific error components.
)',...,,( T21 νννν =
is a NTx1 vector of error components that varies over cross-sectional units and time
periods.
Among other things, our assumptions imply
NTNTT IIeeE
22 )'()'( νµ σσεε +⊗=
Based on the error structure of the model, the covariance between elements of































The variance-covariance matrix of ε can be expressed in the following form
2 2
, 0, 1 1,N n N NQ Qε σ σΩ = +  
where
2 2 2



















is a TxT matrix of unit elements.
Q0,N and Q1,N are symmetric, idempotent, and orthogonal to each other. Therefore, the






The advantage of the suggested decomposition is that the inverse of the variance
covariance matrix can be easily calculated for large N.
To estimate the model (2), Kapoor, Kelejian, and Prucha (2004) suggested a
three-step GMM procedure:
Step1 Initial estimation of residuals u
Use OLS to estimate the regression residuals û :
θγδβ ˆlnˆ*ˆ**)(ˆ*lnˆ Γ−=+⊗−−= FDIZindexWIindexFDIu T
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where
),)(,( ZindexWIindex T ⊗=Γ ,
)',,( γδβθ =
θ$=(Γ'Γ)-1Γ'y
Step 2 Generalized method of moments (GMM)
Kapoor, Kelejian, and Prucha (2004) give six moment conditions that relate to
the coefficients 1,, σσρ v of the model. Based on the moment conditions they suggest
the following GMM procedure.
Let ua ˆ= , uWb ˆ= , uWc ˆ2= . Initial consistent estimators of the parameters ρ, σν ,
say vσρ ~,
~ , are calculated follows:
vσρ ~,







where )',,( 22 vσρρλ = ,
B 1 =
2
N ( T − 1 )
a  Q 0 , N b − 1N ( T − 1 ) b
 Q 0 , N b 1
2
N ( T − 1 )
b  Q 0 , N c − 1N ( T − 1 ) c
 Q 0 , N c 1N T r (W N
 W N )
1
N ( T − 1 )
( a  Q 0 , N b + c  Q 0 , N c ) − 1N ( T − 1 ) b




N ( T − 1 )
a  Q 0 , N a
1
N ( T − 1 )
b  Q 0 , N b
1
N ( T − 1 )
a  Q 0 , N b
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In the second part of Step2 the fully weighted GM estimator for 21
2 ,, σσρ ν is












AAAAv −Υ−= − λλσσρ
σσρ ν
where )',,,( 12221 σσρρλ v=
A 1 =
2
N ( T − 1 )
a  Q 0 , N b − 1N ( T − 1 ) b
 Q 0 , N b 1 0
2
N ( T − 1 )
b  Q 0 , N c − 1N ( T − 1 ) c
 Q 0 , N c 1N T r (W N
 W N ) 0
1
N ( T − 1 )
( a  Q 0 , N b + c  Q 0 , N c ) − 1N ( T − 1 ) b
 Q 0 , N c 0 0
2
N
a  Q 1 , N b − 1N b
 Q 1 , N b 0 1
2
N
b  Q 1 , N c − 1N c
 Q 1 , N c 0 1N T r (W N
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1
N
( a  Q 1 , N b + c  Q 1 , N c ) − 1N b
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is the weighting matrix that lead to the efficient estimators
Step 3 Generalized least square estimation of the coefficient )',,( γδβθ =














and NN QQ ,1
2
1,0





Voice and accountability Measures various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and 
political rights. 
Governance matters IV: Governance
indicators for 1996-2004
Government Effectiveness Measures responses on the quality of public service provision, the 
quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the 
independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. 
Governance matters IV: Governance
indicators for 1996-2005
Economic Indicators
Log GDP per capita PPP based log of GDP per capita in constant 2000 $US World Development Indicators 2005,
World Bank
Log Population Log of population World Development Indicators 2005,
World Bank
Legal Origin Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law of Commercial Law
of each country. There are fove possible origins: (1) English
Common Law; (2) French Commercial Code; (3) German
Commercial Code; (4) Scandinavian Commercial Code; (5)
Socialist/Communsit Laws
La Porta et al (1999)
Resources
Explored oil resources Log of proved reserves of oil, thousand million barrels – Generally
taken to be those quantities that geological and engineering
information indicates with reasonable certainty can be recovered
in the future
Statistical Review of World Energy 2006,
BP report
Share of raw materials in export Share of export of raw materials to total export, calculated as
period average share based on sectoral export data for each
country
The Commodity Trade Statistics
database (UN Comtrade)
Cultural heterogeneity
Linguistic fractionalization Index of fractionalization constructed based on the shares of
languages spoken as "mother tongues"
Alesina et al 2003
Religious affiliation Religion identifies the percentage of population of each country
that belonged to the three most widely spread world religions in
1980. The numbers are in percent (scale from 0 to 100). The
three religions identified are: (1) Roman Catholic; (2) Protestant;
(3) Muslim.
La Porta et al (1999)
Geography
Landlocked: 1 yes 0 no CEPII's distance measures and
geographical data
Absolute latitude Latitude: the absolute value of latitude of the country scaled from
0 to 1.
La Porta et al (1999)
Weights
Distance-based* Inverse of distance between countries if they are located at the
same continent, 0 otherwise
CEPII's distance measures and
geographical data
Common border* 1 if countries have common border, 0 otherwise CEPII's distance measures and
geographical data
Common language* 1 if countries have common language, 0 otherwise CEPII's distance measures and
geographical data
Colony* 1 if one of the countires is a former colony of the other country, 0
otherwise
CEPII's distance measures and
geographical data
* All weights are further row-normalized: weights in any row of a weighting matrix add up to one
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